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Defending the Public’s Forum: Theory and
Doctrine in the Problem of Provocative Speech
JD HSIN*
For more than half a century the heckler’s veto has been a source of provocation. On
the one hand, there now appears to be widespread consensus among courts and
commentators that allowing police to shut down a provocative speaker in a public
space over threats from hostile listeners is simply beyond the constitutional pale.
Taking that constitutional intuition as their guide, the lower courts have generally
approached the problem through a speaker-focused model, in which the government
is seen siding with the majority’s mob over the minority speaker, in violation of the
principle requiring neutrality among speakers and views. But what happens when
the usual roles reverse¾when the provocative speaker is not representative of a
minority opinion but is arguably representative of a larger majority? Relying on the
important recent decision from the Sixth Circuit in Bible Believers v. Wayne County,
this Article argues that this reversal of roles shows us not just the limits of the
speaker-focused model in solving the heckler’s veto problem, but also how it can and
should be broadened to address the increasingly complex protests that have come to
dominate our constitutional focus today. We should therefore take Bible Believers as
the occasion to reconsider the familiar speaker-focused approach to the heckler’s veto,
by reframing it around the different problem that that case represents: not as the
familiar drama of the soapbox orator faced with a hostile audience but as an example
of a public forum faced with hostile takeover. In these increasingly common cases, the
problem of the heckler’s veto should accordingly take on a new conceptual and
doctrinal form: as an attack on a public forum that the police must do everything in
their power to prevent by defending the forum first.

* Honors Attorney, United States Department of Labor and former clerk to Judge John M.
Rogers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. I thank the participants in the
Research Seminar on the First Amendment at Harvard Law School, especially its organizer, Mark
Tushnet, as well as Lisa Hsin, Scott Brewer, Dean Moyar, Richard Bett, Hilary Bok, Angus Burgin,
William Tadros, and the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their helpful criticisms and
suggestions. All the views set forth here are expressed in a personal capacity and do not reflect those
of Judge Rogers, for whom the author clerked after Bible Believers v. Wayne County was decided. All
the errors are, of course, my own.
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INTRODUCTION
On a March evening in 1949, a slight-framed student climbed a
wooden box on a Syracuse sidewalk, and in a “loud, high pitched voice,”
began urging the “Negro people” to “rise up in arms and fight for equal
rights.”1 Over the next twenty minutes, with his voice reverberating
through a speaker hooked to the car idling beside him, Irving Feiner
breathed fire against the powers that were¾the American Legion and the
city’s mayor and, at some point, the President of the United States (a

1. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317 (1951).

HSIN-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2018]

DEFENDING THE PUBLIC'S FORUM

5/26/18 12:47 PM

1101

“bum,” he supposedly snarled).2 As one might expect, Feiner was also
beginning to “sti[r] up a little excitement.”3 “[A]ngry mutterings” swept
through the racially “mixed audience” assembling before him, some
seventy-five or eighty all told. There was pushing and shoving, some
restless “milling around.”4 A few among the listeners began to worry
aloud that the two police officers then on the scene, hastily summoned
by a telephoned complaint, would be unable to control the growing
“excitement.”5 Then came the threat of violence.6 Uglier words coursed
electrically through the crowd as the officers made their way to Feiner,
who was still haranguing, and asked him to step down. Feiner, however,
kept talking. Several tense minutes passed. The officers, now vastly
outnumbered and fearing a full-on riot, approached Feiner once again,
this time explaining that he under arrest for disobeying their order to
leave, and again ordered him down.7 At that, perhaps sensing the
inevitable, Feiner relented, letting out one last, unsettling thought for the
mob that had just succeeded in silencing him: “the law has arrived, and I
suppose they will take over now.”8
The facts of Feiner’s case infamously illustrate what Harry Kalven,
Jr., once called the “genuine puzzle”9 of provocative speech¾a puzzle
now widely identified as the heckler’s veto.10 A speaker, usually
representing a minority view, engages in some form of expressive
conduct in a space traditionally open to the public, only to be shut down
by police who fear that her listeners, already restive, might threaten
wider unrest, possibly violence. And, what makes the veto so grippingly
problematic is easy to see in a case like Feiner’s. Simply by growing
menacing enough, Feiner’s “hostile audience” effectively conscripted the
police to muscle him off a public sidewalk¾the sort of place where one
might expect such talk to be freest. The law arrives only to end up a

2. He would later dispute that account, insisting that if he had insulted President Truman he
would have chosen a slur a bit saltier than ‘bum.’ Douglas Martin, Irving Feiner, 84, Central Figure
in Constitutional Free speech Case, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, at A19.
3. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 317.
4. Id. at 324 (Black, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 317.
6. According to the officers’ testimony, a man approached them¾some twenty minutes into
Feiner’s address¾saying that, “If you don’t get that son of a bitch off, I will go over and get him off
there myself.” Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting). It was only then, the officers said, that they moved
against Feiner.
7. Justice Black observed in dissent that Feiner was originally told that he was being arrested for
“unlawful assembly;” and only later was the charge officially made out as “disorderly conduct.” Id. at
325 (Black, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 318.
9. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140 (1966).
10. Although the substance of the “heckler’s veto” doctrine can be traced to Justice Black’s dissent
in Feiner, as explained below, the label itself is due to Kalven. See id. at 140–45.
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weapon in the hands of the majority’s mob, bluntly wielded against
whatever¾or whomever¾they would rather not hear. Whatever else the
First Amendment may forbid, surely, one might think, it must forbid
that.11
And the courts and commentators have largely agreed. Today,
absent a clear and imminent danger of violence or its actual outbreak,12
it would be simply “out of the question”13 for the police to silence a
speaker simply because of her listeners’ displeasure, surrendering their
baton to the hecklers’ hands. In this broad sense, a heckler’s veto is a
constitutional non-starter. A principal aim of this Article is to explain
why this is so.
As Kalven saw, however, explaining this has always posed
something of a puzzle. Despite this consensus in principle, the exact
contours of a heckler’s veto doctrine have long remained blurry at best.14
Not only has the Court yet to say what exactly the First Amendment
requires of police to keep them from effecting the veto even in the
classical case like Feiner’s; it has yet even to endorse a single theory
explaining what about the veto sends it beyond the constitutional pale.
The heckler’s veto may be clearly out of the question, but the reason why
still remains obscure.
This lack of black letter clarity sets the terms of what might be called
the heckler’s veto problem, requiring an answer to not one but two closely
connected questions. First, what justifies the consensus today that a
heckler’s veto is so clearly unacceptable? And, second, what does the First
Amendment call on the police to do to respect speakers’ right to have
their provocative say even when its provocativeness invites violence?
When the law arrives on a scene where the proverbial fistfight of ideas
threatens to descend to literal fisticuffs, how and on what principle must
it act?
The lower courts that have addressed this last question have largely
answered it with a common doctrinal refrain: The police must defend the
speaker’s right to speak.15 And, though less recognized, they have arrived

11. For an example of how one might try to focus First Amendment jurisprudence around
precisely this concern¾the protection of dissent¾see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 101 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
13. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(describing taxpayer dissenters to government speech as “a First Amendment heckler’s veto” that
would be “out of the question”); see also infra Part I.
14. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, EMERGING THREATS: THE HOSTILE AUDIENCE REVISITED 2 (2017)
(describing the “existing legal doctrine” on this point as “at best, murky.”).
15. See, e.g., Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm. v. City of Santa Monica, 784 F.3d 1286, 1289
(9th Cir. 2015) (describing the heckler’s veto as a violation of the principle of content neutrality,
drawing strict scrutiny); Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 F. App’x 541, 554 (4th Cir. 2010)
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at that answer by way of a common conception of the heckler’s veto,
drawn from the picture classically sketched in Feiner’s case. This picture
is of the hostile audience.16 And the courts have drawn the constitutional
wrong out of that picture by tracing it to its focal point: the point at which
the government moves against the besieged speaker. In order to head off
an escalation in the tensions between soapbox orator and her unfriendly
audience, the police end up picking sides by moving invariably against
the provocative speaker, slighting their duty to remain neutral between
them. Thus the heckler’s veto, at least as revealed in this picture, becomes
just another content-based regulation of speech, and like all other such
regulations, presumptively fails under the First Amendment.17 And so the
most natural way for the police to avoid blundering in this way against
neutrality¾to avoid making the heckling majority the winner and the
besieged speaker the loser¾is for them simply to protect the speaker
first, to some still unclear extent.18 Picturing the heckler’s veto in this way
brings into focus not just an answer to the heckler’s veto problem, but an
explanation of why the usual doctrinal refrain can feel so natural, even
inevitable.
But precisely because this refrain can feel so natural it is also easy to
forget that it represents only one way of understanding the heckler’s veto.
In its more generic sense¾the sense in which one party makes the
government its instrument for suppressing the views of another¾the
heckler’s veto can reach far beyond the familiar drama of speaker and
hostile audience, as the Court itself has seen.19 And, indeed, the last
several years have shown just how unrecognizable the veto can become
in the now common case where, as Rachel Harmon has recently put it,
“police departments face loosely organized and heterogeneous groups
who often seek to bring about social change in ways other than speech.”20
Today’s heckler’s veto has less to do with hostile audiences and soapbox
orators, and more to do with a wholly new sort of protest where
(noting that “‘[c]ourts have recognized a heckler’s veto as an impermissible form of content-based
speech regulation for over sixty years”); Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“‘[D]oes it follow that the police may silence the rabble-rousing speaker? Not at all. The police must
permit the speech and control the crowd; there is no heckler’s veto.’” (quoting Hedges v. Wauconda
Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1993))).
16. For a recent discussion of the history of this problem, see generally SCHAUER, supra note 14.
17. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. R EV. 189 (1983) (discussing the distinction between content-neutral and content-based
regulations).
18. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 14 (describing this as among the “open questions”
surrounding the hostile audience problem).
19. See infra Part I.
20. Rachel A. Harmon, Policing, Protesting, and the Insignificance of Hostile Audiences, KNIGHT
FIRST AMEND. INST., https://knightcolumbia.org/content/policing-protesting-and-insignificance
-hostile-audiences (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
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protestors come less to have their say than, as the slogan goes, to shut
down the places where others would have theirs.21 And as Harmon rightly
sees, these cases have pushed the familiar heckler’s veto doctrine to the
edge of its usefulness, yielding a difficult “mismatch between the doctrine
and the political protests it which it often applies.”22
One might take this breakdown to signal the limits of what doctrine
can realistically do about protests this complex and politically fraught.23
Kalven’s puzzle may not yield to doctrinal solution. But this Article
argues that it does, and that a major obstacle to seeing that solution lies
in the single-minded way that courts and commentators have understood
the heckler’s veto. In order to solve the problem of provocative speech,
then, this Article contends that we will first need to free the heckler’s veto
from the picture out of which it first emerged¾a picture like the one that
opened this Article of the hostile audience. And to do that this Article
focuses on a case presenting a timely twist to the familiar Feiner script:
the recent United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit en banc
decision by the in Bible Believers v. Wayne County,24 in which the Arab
community of Dearborn, Michigan, was forced to confront an outlandish
group of Christian fundamentalists at what was once their annual Arab
International Festival. By reading that case against the line of heckler’s
veto cases that came before it, this Article argues we can come to see not
just the limits to a speaker-focused heckler’s veto but also how it will need
to be broadened to address the increasingly complex protests that fixate
our constitutional attention today.
Accordingly, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I retells of the
story of the heckler’s veto problem by tracing it back to where it first took
root, in Feiner v. New York, and explaining how lower courts have tried
to solve that problem through the speaker focused model. Intuitively
powerful as that model is, however, it has never been fully embraced by
the Court, nor need it be. Part II thus goes on to examine how Bible
Believers challenges that model, by swapping the usual roles of heckled
and hecklers, a minority’s speaker and the majority’s mob, and why we
should take it as the occasion to reconsider the model altogether.
Part III then goes on to consider an alternative solution to the
heckler’s veto problem, through an examination of several seminal

21. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, The ‘Shut It Down!’ Left and the War on the Liberal Mind, N.Y.
MAG. (Apr. 26, 2017, 8:22 AM), nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/04/the-shut-it-down-left-andthe-war-on-the-liberal-mind.html.
22. Harmon, supra 20.
23. Harmon appears to go this way, finding that “doctrine will often be less important than
political will and participant preferences in determining what our system of free expression looks like
on the streets.” Harmon, supra 20.
24. 805 F.3d 228, 244 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2013 (2016).
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heckler’s veto case from the Civil Rights era, beginning with Edwards
v. South Carolina. By offering a new way of focusing the problem of the
heckler’s veto¾not as the attack of a hostile audience but as the hostile
takeover of a public forum¾those cases accordingly suggest a different
way of explaining what makes the heckler’s veto such a constitutional
nonstarter in those cases. The government steps in, not to shut up a
speaker, but to shut down the public forum. That way of viewing the
heckler’s veto, focused resolutely on the forum, also yields a new
doctrinal rule: the police must do everything in their power to ensure the
openness of our public forums by defending those forums first.
But a forum-focused heckler’s veto, on its own, can no more solve
the problem of provocative speech than the speaker-focused model that
falters so badly in Bible Believers. To some this may seem to raise a larger
objection to the whole argument of this Article that making the heckler’s
veto doctrine messier leaves our First Amendment law less principled.
Part IV goes on to explain why this objection, rooted in the abiding faith
that only theory can unify our constitutional doctrine, simply misses the
way doctrine and theory really relate under the First Amendment. By
showing how doctrine and principle come to life through the models that
we make for them¾our free speech fables¾Part IV explains why the
fundamentalist faith in unifying principles and theories can also end up
making our law that much poorer.
I. THE HOSTILE AUDIENCE AND THE HECKLER’S VETO
The story of provocative speech customarily opens with a scene
much like the one that opened this Article¾with a soapbox orator like
Feiner facing down what, in Feiner, came to be called his hostile
audience. Feiner, of course, was only one among many protagonists in
this doctrinal drama. But his case, now considered among the more
extreme examples of a heckler’s veto, is also one of the most revealing,
illustrating not just how the heckler’s veto has come to be understood but
what that understanding presupposes. To see just what that
understanding entails, first one must look to see what these separate
points are and how exactly they came together in Feiner, which means
how they emerge from Justice Black’s dissent.
A. FEINER AND THE HOSTILE AUDIENCE PROBLEM
Feiner’s case plots a now familiar course. He was eventually
convicted for violating New York’s breach of the peace statute, which he
challenged all the way to the Supreme Court, arguing that the application
of the ordinance in his case had violated his First Amendment right to
speak. The Court, however, disagreed. “We are well aware that the
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ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be
allowed to silence a speaker,” Chief Justice Vinson explained, adopting a
label for the problem that eventually stuck.25 That, however, was not
really the issue before them. Instead, the Chief Justice concluded, the
question was whether the Constitution disabled the police from heading
off a near-riot.26 It would have been one thing, he explained, if the police
had been “used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular
views,” as Feiner of course alleged they had.27 But, at least as the majority
read the record, Feiner’s case presented no “such a situation.”28 It seemed
clear enough to the majority that his anger had carried him beyond the
“bounds of argument or persuasion” into incitement¾from the merely
provocative to a direct provocation of violence.29 And, as Justice
Frankfurter added, the Court had already held that restrictions on such
speech raised no constitutional concern.30 Under the circumstances,
then, the police could surely not be held “powerless to prevent a breach
of the peace,” even if that meant cutting short the curbside oratory of a
lone college student.31 Feiner’s conviction would stand.
Justice Black, however, saw things differently. Writing in pointed
dissent, he took the Chief Justice to task for what he regarded as two
critical mistakes: one on the facts, and the other on doctrine. On the
factual side, Justice Black complained that the Court had leaned too
heavily¾credulously, really¾on the lower courts’ view that the situation
on the sidewalk that day had gotten anywhere near dangerous enough to
justify Feiner’s arrest.32 Granted, it appeared that Feiner at some point
called on the African Americans in the crowd to “rise up in arms and
fight” for their rights, though Justice Black had his doubts that that was
quite what Feiner said.33 And true, whatever Feiner actually said, it did
appear to have drawn from somebody a warning that if the police did not

25. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951). Chief Justice Vinson was the first on the Court
to adopt the ‘hostile audience’ label, but as Frederick Schauer has noted, the label was already in use
at the time among academic commentators. See SCHAUER, supra note 14, at 2 n.2.
26. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320.
27. Id. at 321.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (describing “fighting words”
as among the categories of speech that “have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.”). For a discussion of these historical exclusions to the First Amendment’s coverage, see
generally Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 (2015).
31. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321.
32. Id. at 322–23 (Black., J. dissenting).
33. In fact, Justice Black accepted this only grudgingly, for the sake of argument: “[r]eliable
witnesses,” he claimed, instead confirmed that Feiner had said only that his listeners should “rise up
and fight for their rights by going arm in arm to the Hotel Syracuse” to hear John Rogge, a former
assistant attorney general who had come to talk on the subject of civil rights. Id. at 324 n.5.
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shut Feiner up, he would. All the same, none of that realistically
suggested to Justice Black that the scene had reached “a critical
situation,” the point at which simmering outrage had boiled over into
“imminent threat of riot or uncontrollable disorder.”34 After all, “it is
neither unusual nor unexpected that some people at public street
meetings mutter, mill about, push, shove, or disagree, even violently,
with the speaker.”35 What else would a hostile audience look like? The
“ordinary murmurings and objections” of an angry crowd are just that
angry. And if murmurings like those could make a speaker too
provocative for the public street¾creating a “critical situation” justifying
his removal¾it is unclear when a hostile audience would ever not be able
to enlist the police as their instrument. As the Chief Justice put it, this
allow the police to silence views they would rather not hear.
In Justice Black’s view, then, the facts clearly belied the Court’s
conclusion. But even granting the Court its view that the situation had
gone critical, he still found the Court far too willing to tax a speaker like
Feiner for his provocative speech and too unwilling to tax the police to
ensure that he could. For even on the Court’s telling, after the situation
had grown “dangerous,” the “policemen did not even pretend to try to
protect” Feiner before hauling him away.36 Clearly, Justice Black
insisted, the Constitution required more of police than that. As he saw it,
a speaker like Feiner not only enjoyed immunity from the disturbance his
speech was causing; he also deserved a measure of protection¾a
subsidy¾to speak.37 That subsidy for the speaker, and consequent tax on
the public, would have taken the form of a set of instructions to policing
officials: before moving against a provocative speaker, as the officers had
against Feiner, they first “must make all reasonable efforts to protect”
him, to the extent of “arresting [anybody] who threaten[s] to interfere.”38
When verbal push came to literal shove, the First Amendment demanded
that officials at least try to push back against the hostility of the crowd,
apparently whatever the cost. The law should come to defend the speaker
first.
B. REREADING FEINER
Justice Black may not have had a majority with him in Feiner, but
he clearly has the judgment of history on his side. As Frederick Schauer
has said, today “Feiner is commonly taken to represent the extreme case

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 325.
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id. at 327 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 326–27.
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of allowing the hostile audience to exercise the so-called heckler’s veto,”
quite as Justice Black warned it did.39 And although never overruled, in
case after case the courts have taken considerable pains to distance
Feiner’s holding from its troubling implications for provocative speech,
effectively recasting it from the problematic victory it appeared to
represent for the Syracuse mob to a far more forgettable case about
“fighting words.”40 Indeed, it seems now that practically every heckler’s
veto case has become what Justice Stewart once said of Edwards v. South
Carolina—a “far cry” from Feiner.41
Although courts may still praise Feiner as a “fighting words” case,
they have come to bury it in the heckler’s veto context.42 But this early
interment has led the Court, and as a result nearly all the lower courts
and commentators, to overlook the common conceptual ground between
the majority’s opinion and Justice Black’s dissent. To see clearly what
that point of contention was we therefore will have to read Justice Black’s
largely vindicated dissent in light of the positon it has been thought to
discredit. And as will become clear by the end of the next Part, getting
clear on that disagreement can help explain why the heckler’s veto puzzle
still resists a tidy solution, practically or, even, in theory.
1. The ‘Heckler’s Veto’ Concept
Largely because Feiner can seem like such a regrettable aberration
today, at least as an entry in the heckler’s veto canon, it is easy to miss
what the majority there obviously had right. And that, as Chief Justice
Vinson explained, was that the Court could clearly not empower a
“hostile audience” to silence a speaker simply because of what she says,
because of how provocative she or her message has become. Or as the
Chief Justice put it, taking a step up the ladder of abstraction, the police
could not be made “an instrument for the suppression of unpopular
views.”43

39. SCHAUER, supra note 14, at 7.
40. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (concluding case was a “far cry” from
Feiner since there was no “evidence of ‘fighting words.’’’); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965)
(quoting Edwards to the same effect); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (citing Feiner as an
example where a speaker “intentionally provok[ed] a given group to hostile reaction.”); see also
Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1975) (similarly distinguishing Feiner); Bible
Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 245 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (concluding that Feiner
stands solely for the proposition that “incitement does not receive constitutional protection.”).
41. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 236.
42. See SCHAUER, supra note 14, at 7 (describing the Court’s decisions as “mark[ing] Feiner’s
burial.”).
43. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321.
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Neither the thought44 nor the phrasing45 was entirely novel. But the
connection the Chief Justice made there, between the hostile audience
and the idea, was. As he suggested, the reason why the police could not
take the “ordinary murmurings and objections”46 of a crowd as an excuse
to haul off an otherwise lawful speaker47 came down to a more general
constitutional principle, one that that action would plainly have violated.
That principle holds just what the Chief Justice said it did: that the
government cannot allow one party to coopt its coercive power to silence
another. And its generality results from its central abstraction¾the
concept denoting those cases where the government had been so
coopted, or made the “instrument for the suppression” of other views.48
If that concept looks vaguely familiar that is because in a sense it is:
functionally it is the same concept, pitched at a higher level of abstraction
that we know today by the name Kalven gave it, the heckler’s veto. That
it might look only vaguely familiar comes as one of the casualties of
Feiner’s early burial, a point to be taken up next. For now, however, the
relevant point is simply that, despite some appearances to the contrary,
the majority in Feiner did in fact ratify the same principle, and the same
concept, that Justice Black did, dissenting. They both agreed that the
heckler’s veto, however understood, is simply out of the question.
2. The Hostile Audience and a Speaker-Focused Heckler’s Veto
Although this last point may seem obvious enough on closer reading,
it has rarely been noticed.49 No doubt this has something to do with the
Court’s later inclination to read Feiner out of the heckler’s veto canon
entirely¾siding with Justice Black by reading the case as just another
example of punishable fighting words. But that was only the first of
Justice Black’s complaints against the majority, his disagreement on the
facts. He also suggested a second, more principled worry about the
Court’s conclusion, having to do with a question the Court there
effectively sidestepped: why is giving hecklers a veto so clearly out of the

44. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (“Equally obvious is it that a State may
not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving
desirable conditions.”).
45. See Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (noting that the ordinance there
allowed an official to “be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on
national affairs.”).
46. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320.
47. In this discussion I am assuming that the putative speakers have not crossed the line
separating merely provocative speech and speech intentionally provoking violence¾hence the
qualification here, “otherwise lawful,” that I will occasionally drop for convenience.
48. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321.
49. But see Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist., 736 F.3d 1110, 1121 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing this
passage from Feiner when discussing “an impermissible ‘heckler’s veto.’”).
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question, and what should the police do to avoid it? Justice Black, to his
lasting credit, actually suggested an answer to that question. And his
answer not only bridges his factual and doctrinal objections to the
majority’s holding, but also explains why the majority’s adoption of the
wider heckler’s veto concept has gone mostly unnoticed.
As already noted, Justice Black clearly thought the majority had
leaned too heavily on the lower courts’ view of the situation: Feiner may
have said something about “arms,” but did not call anybody to arms;
there was some milling about and muttering in the crowd, but nothing
approaching a riot, etc. But his more basic worry came in answer to the
Chief Justice’s apparent agreement as to the hostile audience: that their
veto could not stand. The trouble, Justice Black suggested, was that the
Chief Justice did not seem to appreciate how hollow, or merely
“theoretical,”50 that concept had ended up in his analysis: if all it took was
a little rowdiness to turn the doctrinal tables against the speaker, it could
easily look as though the concept did not really capture much of anything
at all. That rowdiness just is how a hostile crowd ordinarily expresses its
hostility, after all. And any conception51 of the heckler’s veto blind to that
fact¾one that excludes the silencing of a speaker because of that
rowdiness¾simply misses what makes the hostile audience the
constitutional problem that it had clearly become there. The Court had
given no sense of how the heckler’s veto actually worked there¾what
conception or model of that concept it had drawn on¾and so why the
heckler’s veto, and the principle forbidding it, did not ultimately decide
the case.
One way to read Justice Black’s factual objection, then, is as a
conceptual remark. Whatever conception of the heckler’s veto the
majority had in mind had shown itself, practically, to be empty. And that
suggests another way of looking at Justice Black’s second doctrinal
complaint to the majority’s holding: as an effort to fill out a workable
conception of the heckler’s veto, a practicable model of an otherwise
unavailingly “theoretical” idea. Thus, in his dissent we find Justice Black
not only trying to lay down a clear doctrinal limit to the hostile audience
but also, and more importantly, a principled explanation for it¾what,
that is, explained why the heckler’s veto there was so clearly wrong.
50. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 329 (Black, J., dissenting).
51. Here I am invoking something like the distinction between concept and conception that
Ronald Dworkin has made use of. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 70–71 (1986). A conception,
as I will use the term throughout, is thus a more concrete specification of some concept. To take
Dworkin’s example, we might agree that the concept ‘courtesy’ has to do with showing the proper
respect to others, even though we may debate whether courtesy then requires us to show respect to
some people automatically, based on their social status in all or some contexts, or whether respect
need be earned¾these being two conceptions of ‘courtesy.’ Id. As explained more fully in Part IV, I
will treat the notions of conception and a conceptual model interchangeably.
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He sought both from the contextual realities of situations like the
one Feiner faced¾the normative dynamics, as it were, of addressing a
hostile audience¾as well as the practical upshot that the majority’s
holding had for them. Justice Black was concerned with those he saw as
most vulnerable to hostile audiences generally: those holding minority
views. And thus he explained his dissent partly on the ground that the
Court had given practically unfettered discretion to police to “silenc[e] in
any city” public expressions of unpopular opinions,52 and especially the
speech of those “minority speakers,” like Feiner,53 who dared confront
publicly a majority not inclined to be confronted.54 Feiner, after all, was
railing against more or less visible public figures, presumably
empowered by some relevant majority. He was especially vulnerable,
then, to the hostility of public disapproval, not only for standing up for a
racial minority, but against the powers-that-were, the “current
administration[].”55
That vulnerability also suggested what was so wrong about allowing
the hostility of his crowd to silence him, permitting the police to become
the instrument of their hostility. That, Justice Black intimated, could be
seen in what the majority had effectively handed the government: “a
simple and readily available technique” by which a majority could
effectively recruit the government to its side, against a minority, or the
authorities could essentially side with themselves against dissidents, and
silence their critics.56 The law arrived only to end up picking sides,
inevitably the majority’s or their presumptive representatives’ side. Or,
putting the same point in the language of “great principles” that Justice
Black teased,57 what made the veto so wrong there was its violation of the
government’s duty to remain neutral between speakers and their
messages. The government, by backing one side with its coercive power,
had effectively joined in its attack on the other. And thus the most
obvious way for the government to respect its duty of neutrality under
the circumstances was for it to at least try to defend that speaker against
that attack, and his attackers, first.
Admittedly some of this analysis lies beneath the surface of Justice
Black’s dissent¾he never says anything directly, for instance, about
neutrality¾but it is clear enough that one could read it in these terms.
And when so read, it becomes equally clear that Justice Black answers
52. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 328 (Black, J., dissenting).
53. In the senses used in Justice Black’s dissent, ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ obviously concerned
more than just racial minorities, but political minorities as well.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 323.
57. Id. at 329.
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the majority by simply taking them at their word, though giving that word
some much needed content. That content, as just seen, was a workable
model or conception of the heckler’s veto: what we might call the
speaker-focused model. That model traces the same basic conceptual
pattern on which Justice Black agreed with the Chief Justice: that the
government cannot be made an instrument by one side for suppressing
the views of another. And what that means concretely, at least in the
context of the hostile audience, is that the government must try to defend
the speaker first. Otherwise, the government, there through the police,
would be effectively liberated to do what it surely cannot under the First
Amendment¾make one side the winner, and another the loser.
Together, then, this principle and rule complete a model of the heckler’s
veto¾the heckler’s veto as an impermissible content-based restriction
on a speaker’s message. And that model accordingly explains why, as all
sides have agreed since Feiner, a heckler’s veto is simply out of the
question.
C. A CONFLATING CONSENSUS
As powerful and intuitive as his model was, Justice Black still found
himself dissenting in Feiner. There is little question, however, that that
conception of the heckler’s veto has taken on a life of its own in the case
law. This goes beyond the clear consensus that the heckler’s veto,
however understood, is simply a constitutional non-starter.58 More than
this, lower courts and commentators have agreed on the outlines of
Justice Black’s solution to the hostile audience problem, including his
focus on neutrality between speakers and the rule to defend the heckled
speaker first.59 Indeed, the Court itself has at least suggested that Justice
Black was right to focus on neutrality as a central concern for restrictions
of speech in the face of hostile audiences.60

58. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm. v. City of Santa Monica, 784 F.3d 1286,
1292–93 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing the heckler’s veto as a violation of the principle of content
neutrality, drawing strict scrutiny); Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 F. App’x 541, 554 (4th Cir.
2010) (noting that “[c]ourts have recognized a heckler’s veto as an impermissible form of
content-based speech regulation for over sixty years”); Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d 531, 537
(7th Cir. 2005) (“[D]oes it follow that the police may silence the rabble-rousing speaker? Not at all.
The police must permit the speech and control the crowd; there is no heckler’s veto.” (quoting Hedges
v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
60. See, e.g., Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 135 (1992) (concluding that
the heckler’s veto is a content-based restriction, and so requires strict scrutiny); see also McCullen
v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531–32 (2014) (noting that a restriction on speech would “not be content
neutral if it were concerned with undesirable effects that arise from the direct impact of speech on its
audience or [l]isteners’ reactions to speech” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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But as Justice Black’s model has passed largely unchallenged into
black letter law, at least among lower courts,61 it also appears to have
displaced all awareness that it is, in fact, only a model¾merely one
conception of the heckler’s veto. Indeed, lower courts and commentators
now widely take the two to be the same: the heckler’s veto concept has
merged with its model of the hostile audience problem.62 Some of the
blame for this conflation may belong to Kalven, who appears to have
thought of the two as the same.63 Indeed, in an early commentary, Alfred
Kamin observed that what Kalven thought of as the ‘heckler’s veto’
apparently amounted to little more than “a crowd-handling
problem”¾to which he added, presciently, that a concept that aptly
named might “quickly become a substitute for thought.”64 As Part II
argues, in at least one major case it now has.
Despite this widespread conflation among lower courts, the
Supreme Court has never made it itself. On the contrary, the Court has
occasionally suggested that it, too, understands the heckler’s veto to have
more to it than just hostile audiences. In Reno v. ACLU, for example, the
Court struck down a portion of the Communications Decency Act that
would have outlawed the transmission of certain supposedly
objectionable content that the sender knew would reach a “specific
person” under 18 years old.65 Although a far cry from the classic hostile
audience,66 the Court overturned that provision with the explanation that
it “would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a ‘heckler’s
veto,’ upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on [to
some online forum] and inform the would be discoursers that his 17-yearold child¾a ‘specific person . . . under 18 years of age’ . . . would be

61. The nearest the Court appears to have come to embracing the speaker-focused model was in
Brown v. Louisiana, where, in a footnote, it observed that the “[p]articipants in an orderly
demonstration in a public place are not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the fact of
constitutionally protected demonstrate itself, that their critics might react with disorder or violence.”
383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966). Notably, however, the Brown Court did not go so far as to say, as the
speaker-focused model does, that the First Amendment requires the police to protect the speaker first,
at whatever cost. The Court instead said only that speakers would not be subject to charge (for
example, for breach of the peace) even if they happened to provoke hostility from their listeners.
62. Rosenbaum v. San Francisco, 484 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing the heckler’s
veto as “an impermissible content-based speech restriction”); Startzell v. Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183,
200 (3d. Cir. 2008) (same); see also Ruth McGaffey, The Heckler’s Veto: A Reexamination, 57 MARQ.
L. REV. 39 (1973) (apparently treating the heckler’s veto and hostile audience problem
interchangeably).
63. See KALVEN, JR., supra note 9 (describing the heckler’s veto in terms of the hostile audience).
64. Alfred Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 177,
219–20 (1966–67).
65. 521 U.S. 844 (1999).
66. See Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse,
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1312 (2007) (noting the same).
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present.”67 Clearly the “broad powers of censorship” that Congress had
conferred under the Act¾the heckler’s veto there¾had nothing directly
to do with a threat of violence from an angry crowd: the only ‘crowd’ was
virtual, and even in the hypothetical there is no suggestion that violence
would follow if users of the forum kept up their lewd posting even after
learning that a seventeen-year-old was scrolling along with them.
Whatever the Justices understood by the ‘heckler’s veto’ there, it had
nevertheless clearly come loose from its usual conceptual mooring in the
hostile audience problem. And that at least cracks the door to the
possibility that the Court was willing to entertain a different conception
of the heckler’s veto, to address these obviously different
circumstances.68
Over the years this wider use of the ‘heckler’s veto,’ abstracted from
the hostile audience context, has made an occasional appearance in the
opinions of a number of Justices.69 How more exactly they may have
understood that concept¾what particular model or conception they had
in mind when they used it as they did¾is not always clear. Nevertheless,
the important thing is what these uses of the heckler’s veto all have in
common, besides the bare name. And that is what Chief Justice Vinson
picked out in Feiner, the basic pattern of the ‘heckler’s veto’ concept: that
the government has in each case become one side’s instrument in
suppressing the views of another. As the next Part argues, letting in a
little daylight between these two levels of abstraction¾between the
concept and its conception or model¾can help dispel some of the
darkness that has now settled over the problem of provocative speech.
II. ATTACKING THE PUBLIC’S FORUM: OR THE NEW HECKLER’S VETO
It is now clearly settled that allowing the hostile audience a veto over
a provocative speaker is out of the question, and in Feiner, Justice Black
first told us why, through the speaker-focused model he implicitly
developed there. But Justice Black also gave us only that: a model of the
heckler’s veto that has earned its keep in those cases that have felt most
67. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997); see also Leanza, supra note 66.
68. That is to say, the Court might still have thought of that case of the heckler’s veto under the
same speaker-focused conception: as, that is, just a different example of an impermissible
content-based restriction on some speaker’s speech. The only point here, the same that Leanza also
appears to make, is that the Court’s willingness to apply the concept to a situation so clearly different
from the “classic” hostile audience case suggests that they may have been drawing on a different
conception (or model) of the concept as well. See Leanza, supra note 66.
69. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2115 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009); see also Bible Believers
v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 269 (6th Cir. 2015) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing these cases
and noting that “the Court has used ‘heckler’s veto’ as shorthand for the undesirability of opponents
being able to cut off some disfavored speech, idea, or policy”).
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like Feiner¾the classic drama of the soapbox orator facing down a
murmuring mob. Not all heckler’s veto cases have reenacted the same
tidy drama. And where they have not, the concept has begun to tear away,
little by little, from the speaker-focused conception now encased in black
letter. As this Part explains, a recent decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit¾Bible Believers v. Wayne County¾
exemplifies this different breed of heckler’s veto cases, and, by upending
the familiar script, reveals why the concept and conception not only can
but sometimes should come apart.
A. FLIPPING THE SCRIPT: BIBLE BELIEVERS V. WAYNE COUNTY
For the nearly twenty years leading to this case, the city of Dearborn,
Michigan, played host to the Arab International Festival, a celebration
that at one time drew visitors from around the world. That it was in
Dearborn was also no accident. The city is home to the second-largest
Arab American population in the country, after New York City, and it has
naturally counted a large number of Muslims among its population,
although the city’s majority remains non-Arab and non-Muslim.70 The
yearly summer festival, held on several blocks of Dearborn’s streets, was
free of charge to the public and featured the usual staples of the county
fair¾music, food, carnival rides. But it also attracted a sizable number of
religious groups seeking to use¾or exploit¾such a large gathering to
spread their various messages. Normally they did that by reserving one
of the many informational booths available to vendors; not all, however,
elected to do so. Among the latter were a number of evangelical Christian
groups, who, unlike the other religious attendees, chose instead to roam
throughout the festival grounds to proselytize as they saw fit.
On June 15, 2012, one such group¾the Bible Believers¾appeared
at the festival as they had the year before, largely, they claimed, to make
a point about free speech.71 And like the year before, they came with signs
that were, to say the least, provocative. (“Islam Is A Religion of Blood and
Murder,” read one typical sign, and another, “Jesus Is the Way, the Truth,
and the Life. All Others Are Thieves and Robbers.”)72 In addition to these
printed provocations, one of the Bible Believers had brought a
megaphone, to amplify the walking sermon, while another carried a
severed pig’s head, hoisted on a stick¾a symbol meant to “ke[ep] [the

70. Niraj Warikoo, Arab Americans Become Majority on Dearborn Council, USA TODAY (Nov. 6,
2013, 9:41 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/06/arab-americansbecome-majority-on-dearborn-mich-council/3460591/.
71. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 236.
72. Id. at 238.
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Muslims] at bay,” one Bible Believer later explained, since “they are kind
of petrified of that animal.”73
The Bible Believers, pig’s head and signs in tow, began their usual
wandering through the festival, preaching as they went. Their sermon, it
turned out, outdid their signs. Muslims, they explained to whomever they
met, followed “a false prophet,” a “pedophile” and a “pervert,” who
“want[ed] to molest a child;” God, they assured them, “will reject you”
and “put your religion into hellfire when you die.”74 The message soon
drew a following of adolescent on-lookers, many apparently Muslim, and
many, understandably, displeased. Debates soon broke out between the
sides. Soon, the angrier among the children began pelting the line of
preachers with bottles and other litter. As the crossfire of harsh words
gave way to a one-sided barrage of flying garbage, several officers from
the Wayne County police stepped in, warning the crowd against any more
throwing and ordering the Bible Believers to put away their megaphone.
The Bible Believers objected, but obliged, as did the crowd, at least
momentarily. The street-preachers then resumed their march through
the festival, with a thickening stream of on-lookers trailing behind them.
Soon, however, they came under another bombardment of bottles of
debris, including a few larger plastic crates; one Bible Believer was struck
in the forehead, which left a bloody gash.75 An officer finally approached
the Bible Believers to warn them that they were “causing [a]
disturbance,” by “tell[ing] [the crowd] stuff that enrages them,” and that
their presence posed “a direct threat to the safety of everyone” at the
festival.76 An exchange ensued between the Bible Believers’ apparent
leader and an officer, resulting in a final warning: leave or face a citation
for disorderly conduct.77 At that, the Bible Believers relented, filing out
of the festival under escort of over a dozen officers.78
The Bible Believers subsequently sued several of the officers and
their employer, Wayne County, and argued principally that those officials
had denied them their freedom to speak at the festival by effectively
forcing them out once the crowd grew restless.79 The district court sided
with the county, granting them summary judgment on all counts, which
a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed.80 The full court, in a rare
73. Id.
74. Id. at 238–39.
75. Id. at 269 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see also J. Mark Campbell, American Muslims Stone
Christians in Dearborn, MI (Original Edit), YOUTUBE (June 26, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vnJBW49afzg).
76. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 24O.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 239.
79. Id. at 233.
80. Id.
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decision,81 agreed to take the case en banc, and later reversed the panel,
granting summary judgment to the Bible Believers instead.
To the en banc majority, the case looked “easy.”82 The record, which
included footage of the incident, made clear that the officers had done
little, and arguably nothing, to pacify the Bible Believers’ adolescent
detractors, even as their anger boiled over into bottle throwing. Worse,
as Judge Clay explained for the court, when the officers came to eject the
Bible Believers they did so saying that the crowd’s surliness gave them
reason enough to eject the Bible Believers.83 For the seven judges who
joined Judge Clay’s majority opinion in full, the police had plainly flouted
the First Amendment’s command of neutrality¾an open-and-shut case
of the heckler’s veto.84 The county would have to pay.85
For such an easy case, it nevertheless splintered the court quite
badly. In all, seven judges dissented, drawing a number of sharply
worded exchanges, among them two revealing dissents by Judges Rogers
and Gibbons. And together the dissents suggest that, despite
appearances, the case was not so easy after all.
B. AN ANOMALOUS FORMALISM
The first hint of trouble came in Judge Rogers’s principal dissent,
which opened with a startling warning. The majority, he explained, had
“effectively advise[d] how to force the police to help disrupt a minority’s
speech and assembly rights.”86 Sketching that advice out as a “roadmap,”
he went on:

81. See Pierre Bergeron, Dwindling Number of Sixth Circuit En Banc Cases Is Not Escaping
Notice, SIXTH CIR. APPELLATE BLOG (June 29, 2011), https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/
en-banc-watch/dwindling-number-of-sixth-circuit-en-banc-cases-is-not-escaping-notice/).
82. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 261.
83. In the video, the officer can clearly be heard explaining to the Bible Believers why they had to
leave: “I mean look at your people here. Look it, look it. This is crazy.” See Campbell, supra note 75, at
18:17–18:21.
84. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 247–255.
85. And pay they did: the final judgment entered against the county came to $197,500. Judgment
Entered Against Wayne County Sheriffs for Violating Christians’ Free Speech Rights, AM. FREEDOM LAW
CTR. (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/press-release/judgment-enteredagainst-wayne-county-sheriffs-for-violating-christians-free-speech-rights/.
86. Id. at 274 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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Yes, you can get the police to help you attack and disrupt something like a
minority cultural identity fair, even if the police are not inclined to do so.
Tell the police your plans ahead of time, and bring photographers. Get a
determined group of disrupters and go in with the most offensive and
incendiary chants, slogans, insults, and symbols¾the more offensive the
better. The object is to stir up some physical response. Then, when things
get rough (your goal), insist that the police protect you, and (ironically)
your First Amendment rights, by serving as a protective guard. The peace
officers cannot at that point tell you to leave, even to avoid injury to you,
because if the peace officers do that, they will have to pay you damages.
Faced with the choice of allowing you to be an injured martyr (keep your
cameras ready) or serving as a protective guard as the disruption escalates,
the peace officers will doubtless choose the latter and become your
phalanx. It’s a win-win situation for you, and a lose-lose situation for the
minority group putting on the fair.87

This result, Judge Rogers concluded, was not just perverse but
unnecessary. Indeed, “[o]nly a formalistic application of First
Amendment doctrines . . . could lead to a result so inconsistent with the
core of the First Amendment.”88 Even worse was the “unfortunate[]
iron[y]” that the Bible Believers had “succeed[ed] in their
tactics . . . based on towering . . . cases involving minority civil rights
protests.”89 For, “[i]n the greater Detroit community, it is the minority’s
cultural expression that loses from today’s decision,” given that the Bible
Believers had come “from a different part of a larger community to
disrupt the First Amendment activity of Arab Americans¾a sometimes
feared, misunderstood, or despised minority within that larger
community.”90 Looked at “realistically,” the Bible Believers, not the
festival-goers, were the real hecklers.91
Judge Rogers, along with the four judges who joined his dissent,
clearly felt that the majority had misused the heckler’s veto. But his
dissent does not quite as clearly indicate how they had misused it¾what
made the use of that notion and doctrine there so unhelpfully
“formalistic.” It could certainly seem, after all, as though the majority had
only followed out the doctrine to its natural, if ugly conclusion. The Bible
Believers had come to preach, and the adolescents came to heckle. As the
crowd grew angrier at what the Bible Believers were saying, the police
stepped in only to end up ejecting the speakers. To all appearances, the
speaker-focused model fit. And yet the majority could find no evidence
that the police had made any effort to defend the Bible Believers’ right to

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 278 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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speak before leading them away under threat of citation¾a plain
violation of the defend-the-speaker rule. The result seemed irresistible.
Although Judge Rogers ultimately rested his rejection of the
majority’s view on the apparent outbreak of violence,92 he nevertheless
hinted that their use of the speaker-focused model resulted from a
serious misunderstanding. Something in the facts of the case, he
suggested, was atypical, or “unusual,” as Judge Sutton echoed in his own
partial concurrence.93 And that unusualness revealed itself in what the
model ultimately required the majority to rule there: the “unfortunately
ironic” result that the county would have to pay the group that had come
quite deliberately to disrupt a festival celebrating a community of
minorities, no less expressive than a hateful sermon. The
speaker-focused model, in a word, did not quite seem to fit. And Judge
Rogers’s dissent suggests three reasons why, in the form of three
anomalies.
C. HECKLER OR COUNTER-SPEAKER?
The first and perhaps most obvious anomaly had to do with labeling.
As Judge Rogers pointed out, it seems less than obvious who the hecklers
really were here: the outraged teenagers or the reactionaries who came
to enrage them. And that is because in a case like Bible Believers there no
longer appears to be just a single, if perhaps collective, speaker and a
single hostile audience. Instead we have a clash of many speakers, and,
as a result, no unproblematic way of picking the hecklers out from the
heckled.
Just look again at what happened on the streets of Dearborn. The
Bible Believers, brandishing their pig’s head, begin preaching their
gospel of slurs; a crowd gathers and some people in the crowd bicker with
the Bible Believers, while others simply curse them; the Bible Believers,
feeling drowned out, grow louder, the edge of their sermon sharpening
with every insult; and on it spirals, ominously, into chaos. Once the police
arrive, which side do they pick as the constitutionally deserving speaker,
and which do they escort away as the undeserving heckler? Obviously,
one might think, the party that appears to have come with the provocative
message, and the one that appears to be its disagreeable audience. But
the festival also had a message of its own, as did the festival goers, some
of whom fell to debating the Bible Believers. And the festival goers were
also expressing themselves first. Their presence on Dearborn’s streets
was the only reason the Bible Believers showed up at all. Why, then, were
the Bible Believers not the hostile audience bristling at the festival’s and
92. Id. at 277–78.
93. Id. at 266 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the festival-goers’ messages, the hecklers whose veto the majority voted
to uphold? And so the difficulty remains.
This is not to say, of course, that the police have no way of picking
one side as the collective speaker and the other side as their hostile
audience under the circumstances. But it does suggest that, to do so, the
police will end up having to do exactly what neutrality would rather them
not: simply identify the respective points of view being expressed, then
pick the seemingly saner side as the speaker and the side that feels just a
bit too outrageous as the heckler. Or as one police officer told the Bible
Believers: “I mean look at your people . . . This is crazy.”94 But this
certainly seems like an odd way to enforce neutrality: today’s absurdity
could well be tomorrow’s orthodoxy, after all. Nor is it at all clear how the
police could avoid labeling the sides, consciously or not, based on what
they are saying or, even, who they are. The Bible Believers would not
unreasonably have wondered if the all-too-human police on the scene
were refusing to move more aggressively against the adolescent bottle
throwers because they were fellow Arab Americans or Muslims or, more
likely, just their neighbors’ kids. That easily, an implement of an inclusive
neutrality winds up a weapon for neutralizing the appeal of outsiders.
And so the problem only deepens. Just to be able to use the model it
seems that the police would end up having to violate its basic
principle¾that the government should not be in the business of picking
sides. And such a result, if not self-defeating, is quite problematic.
D. SUBSIDY FOR DISRUPTION?
Even if there were a neutral way of deciding which party was the
“speaker” and which party was the “heckler” under these circumstances,
the speaker-focused model ends up in a still more vexing anomaly. As
Judge Rogers asked, why would its application here not effectively force
the government to undermine the very theory of viewpoint neutrality it
is supposed to uphold? As the “roadmap” lays out, the question is hardly
rhetorical.
Just examine what Bible Believers holds. The whole point of the
speaker-focused model, fully endorsed by the en banc majority, is its
promise of a subsidy for speech. For a speaker like Feiner, the subsidy
would have meant the difference between his having a public say on an
important public question or, marginal college student that he was, likely
not much of one at all. In other hands, however, that subsidy becomes
something decidedly less noble¾a license not to speak but to disrupt, on
pain of liability for the police if they dither or skimp in their supporting

94. See Campbell, supra note 75.
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role. And though Judge Rogers raised this point only hypothetically, it in
fact proved to be anything but. For shortly after the events that led to this
case the Arab festival the organizers decided to call it off indefinitely,
partly out of concern that a group like the Bible Believers would return,
this time reinforced by police escort.95 If, as the Court has emphatically
said, the “whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are
treated with the same respect as are majority views,”96 it is difficult to see
how that theory can consistently support a doctrinal rule all but ensuring
that the members of a majority can enlist the support of the government,
through the subsidy of police escort, to disrupt a festival put on by a
minority community. A doctrine capable of diminishing an already
vulnerable voice in American life would hardly seem to honor a principle
calling for the respect for all voices.
E. LESS SPEECH, NOT MORE
The last point, unlike the first, does find an answer of sorts under
the speaker-focused heckler’s veto. But that answer only adds to the list
of misgivings about its use. For even granting that things worked out
badly in the end for the Dearborn public, this answer runs, their
misfortune need not be taken as an argument against the model but the
way that the Bible Believers had, in effect, weaponized it. And the tables
could easily turn: a group of radical imams, reading Bible Believers, could
decide to stage their own counter-rally at a Christmas festival, say, railing
viciously against Christian belief, and yet they, too, would be assured the
same backing of police escort, the same subsidy to disrupt. The subsidy
promised by the traditional heckler’s veto, even if spent disrespectfully,
is at least not handed out discriminatorily. And nothing about that
subsidy should therefore offend our constitutional scruples, or at least
not the basic scruple of content neutrality.97 All that neutrality
commands, after all, is that the same measure of respect be meted out to
all parties¾Muslim and Christian, minority and majority¾however
thin.
This, though obviously true, still does not quite get at the more basic
problem, one that became especially conspicuous in the aftermath of
Bible Believers. For even though this subsidy for disruption may be
equally free to all comers, its effects would likely spread less evenly.
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that its use would fall much harder
95. Opinion, Canceling the Arab International Festival Was an Admission of Defeat, THE ARAB
AMERICAN NEWS (Apr. 3, 2015, 3:28 AM), http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/news/
id_10291/Canceling-the-Arab-International-Festival-was-an-admission-of-defeat.html.
96. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
97. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 32 (2013) (describing content neutrality
as “[t]he central command of First Amendment doctrine”).
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on already marginalized groups, groups that are almost by definition
more vulnerable to the sort of disruptions sanctioned by the
speaker-focused model. Again, one need only look at what followed in the
wake of Bible Believers itself: public fatigue over the ugly street clashes,
and the escalating costs of insuring against them, took an ultimately fatal
toll on the festival. And the situation hardly looked like a fluke rather
than the natural, perhaps inevitable, result of expressly handing would
be disrupters the legal cover to wage campaigns of disruption.98 To model
the heckler’s veto after the hostile audience here, then, appears to imperil
another belief basic under the First Amendment: that we should strive
for “more speech, not enforced silence.”99
F.

SAME CONCEPT, NEW MODEL

Together, these three anomalies help explain why the result in Bible
Believers could feel so “unfortunately ironic,” so unfortunate in its irony
as to make the use of the speaker-focused heckler’s veto there feel like a
blunt and awkward misfit¾“formalistic,” as Judge Rogers put it. Judge
Rogers, focused on the violent stir on the streets, declined to explain just
what he might have meant by the accusation. But Judge Gibbons, also
dissenting, arguably did. And putting together their two dissents we can
begin to see just where the majority went wrong in Bible Believers: by
collapsing the distinction between the heckler’s veto concept and its
speaker-focused conception.
In her own dissent, posed as an “alternative path to the same result”
reached by Judge Rogers, Judge Gibbons agreed that the court could
have rejected liability against the county.100 But she did so by taking on
the majority on different grounds. “The concept” of the heckler’s veto, she
argued, did not clearly draw anything like the constitutional line that the
majority claimed to have traced in heckler’s veto cases past, its “‘heckler’s
veto’ rule” requiring the police to defend the speaker, not just first, but
apparently to the end, no matter how bitter it becomes.101 At most, she
countered, the court had explicitly adopted a broader¾and practically
more dilute¾proposition: that “constitutional rights may not be denied
simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise.”102 Nor could
98. I use ‘campaign’ advisedly: the Bible Believers had gone to the festival before, drawing each
time a similarly angry reaction, and did so expressly to make a point about “free speech.” See WXYZ
-TV Detroit, Emotions Run High at Dearborn Festival, YOUTUBE (June 17, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TSUILV3atKg (featuring the leader of the Bible Believers
describing why they came to the 2011 Arab International Festival).
99. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
100. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 266 (6th Cir. 2015) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
101. Id. at 269, 271.
102. Id. at 268 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965)).
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she discern among the more recent opinions of the Justices a ‘heckler’s
veto’ concept quite like the powerful “doctrinal tool” wielded by the
majority.103 It had instead become mere “shorthand for the undesirability
of opponents being able to cut off some disfavored speech, idea, or
policy”¾a “debater’s point.”104 Clearly, then, neither of these¾the
concept or the principle¾articulates a rule anywhere near as particular
as the majority’s, and so neither, she concluded, could support liability
against the county or its officers.105
Judge Gibbons, like Judge Rogers, was ultimately less concerned
about making a positive doctrinal point than pressing home a practical
one, about the violent realities that confronted the police during the
festival. But she clearly had a negative point to make, effectively the same
made at the close of the last Part. The heckler’s veto concept, she rightly
saw, was not the same as the Bible Believers court’s conception of it. And
while the court has obviously acknowledged the heckler’s veto (the
concept) and the impermissibility of effecting one (the principle), Judge
Gibbons also rightly noticed that the Court had never fully endorsed that
conception, essentially the speaker-focused model limned by Justice
Black in Feiner. Moreover, even if the Court had made the occasional
suggestion that the speaker-focused model would make sense of some
cases, it had never implied that it was the only one¾the conception of
the heckler’s veto, applicable to every case. And here her dissent
dovetailed with Judge Rogers’s. Because precedent did not bind the court
in the conflation of the two¾heckler’s veto concept and speaker-focused
conception¾there was simply no reason why the majority should have
felt compelled to deploy that conception in a case like Bible Believers.
They could claim that they had to reach the result they did, then, only by
feigning that compulsion. And, as Judge Rogers polished off the point,
that old conceptual sleight-of-hand goes by a familiar
name¾formalism.106
As one would expect, the point of these twin dissents was mainly
critical, and in fairness to the majority, they more raised a question than
answered it. And the anomalies produced by the speaker-focused model
suggest that their question was, and remains well-worth raising. Their
question divides naturally into halves. What would it have meant, first,
for the court to have reconsidered the heckler’s veto on the unusual facts
of that case, and to have poured a new conception into an old conceptual
103. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 271 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 269–71.
105. Id. at 271.
106. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511–512 (1988) (noting that “[w]e
condemn Lochner as formalistic not because it involves a choice, but because it attempts to describe
this choice as compulsion”).
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bottle as a result? And why, secondly, was the majority so unwilling to do
so? The next two Parts suggest answers to each of these questions.
III. DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S FORUM
To the en banc majority, Bible Believers should have made for “an
easy case to resolve,” at least “[f]rom a constitutional standpoint.”107 But
even they were willing to admit that it was “easy to understand” why the
bitter realities of their result¾turning over “a joyous Festival celebrating
the city’s Arab heritage” to a roving band of reactionaries¾left something
to be desired.108 Yet those desires apparently found no sanction in
doctrine, at least as they conceived of the heckler’s veto. So what choice
did they have but to hand judgment to the Bible Believers?
Judges Rogers and Gibbons pointed the way of an answer: rethink
the heckler’s veto, in light of the oddity of that case’s facts. But where,
exactly, should they have looked to in their rethinking? None of the
dissenters clearly addressed that question, but, once again, Judge Rogers
hinted at an answer: the “towering . . . cases involving minority civil
rights protests.”109 This Part takes up that suggestion, and argues that
indeed one of those cases¾Edwards v. South Carolina¾leads off a
closely connected series of decisions on the heckler’s veto that make
them, in yet another respect, a far cry from a hostile-audience case like
Feiner. Drawing that distinction is a basic difference in doctrinal
focus¾away from an attack on a speaker to an attack on the public’s
forum. And that focus reveals an altogether new way of conceptualizing
the wrong of the heckler’s veto: what we might call the problem of the
hostile takeover rather than the hostile audience. In these cases, the
government arrives not to join a crowd in shutting up a speaker but in
shutting down a forum, and, in doing so, ends up violating a principle
other than neutrality: its duty not to abet the standardization of
expression in public forums. Together this duty and that focus yield not
just a new way of thinking about the heckler’s veto¾a new forum-focused
conception¾but, also, a new constitutional rule, requiring the police to
protect provocative speech by defending the forums where the
provocative have their say.
A. EDWARDS V. SOUTH CAROLINA AND THE ORIGINS OF
ANTI-STANDARDIZATION
The facts of Edwards v. South Carolina, like those in Feiner, would
seem at first blush to present the heckler’s veto in its classic form. There,
107. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 261.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 278 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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as in earlier heckler’s veto cases, the speakers represented a clear
minority: African American youths protesting the de jure discrimination
of segregated South Carolina. And like in Feiner, their protest was by all
accounts peaceful, with well-dressed late-teens and twenty-somethings
making their way from Zion Baptist Church, in Columbia, to the state
house grounds. They walked single-file or two-abreast, some toting
placards, declaring them “proud to be a Negro,” and crying “Down with
segregation.”110 None obstructed pedestrian or vehicular traffic, and,
despite the crowd of 200 to 300 onlookers that had gathered to watch,
there were no obvious signs of impending disorder or violence.111 And yet,
as in Feiner, the police sensed trouble. Eventually several officers
approached the protestors to give a now familiar warning: they had
fifteen minutes to disperse or face arrest. Instead, they began to sing and
clap; hymns filled the air.112 Fifteen minutes later, true to their word, the
police arrested them, leading to convictions in state court for breach of
the peace.
The Supreme Court had little trouble reversing the protestors’
convictions. Yet at the heart of Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court,
joined by all but the southerner Justice Clark, there appeared an arguably
new thought about the heckler’s veto, addressed to concerns somewhat
different from those that shaped Justice Black’s dissent in Feiner.
For Justice Stewart, the decisive doctrinal point was familiar
enough: the First Amendment could not tolerate government officials
“mak[ing] criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.”113 Yet,
continuing on with a long quotation from Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
another case involving the heckler’s veto, Justice Stewart suggested that
the worry moving the Court may not have been quite so familiar.
An important “function of free speech under our system of
government,” as Justice Douglas famously wrote in Terminiello, “is to
invite dispute.” Speech could be thought to “best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”114 To this extent
Justice Douglas was simply agreeing with Justice Black in Feiner: a
speaker has a right to express “provocative and challenging” ideas, and
allowing hecklers a veto clearly conflicts with the government’s duty to

110. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 231 (1963).
111. Id. at 231–32.
112. Id. at 233.
113. Id. at 237; Under the now standard doctrine of incorporation, Justice Stewart attributed this
proposition to the Fourteenth Amendment, as a bar specifically against state officials, but the point
applies generally to government officials at whatever level.
114. Id. (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
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remain neutral between the sides.115 Yet the central reason why silencing
the provocative speaker was problematic in that case was not, as Justice
Black had implied, because it involved a privileging of one set of clashing
speakers over the other. The concern moving Justice Douglas in
Terminiello seemed instead to revolve around a different, though equally
intolerable counterfactual: had the Court allowed the police to move
against the protesters there, it would thereby have permitted “the
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups.”116 This phrasing, peculiarly passive,
bears some attention. The result that the Court feared was a fact that
followed from the government’s intervention: the standardization of
ideas by dominant political or social groups, including of course the
government itself. And formulated this way, Justice Douglas’ concern
invites a certain refocusing of the problem¾away from what the
government itself does in effecting the heckler’s veto (the act of
privileging of one speaker over another) and toward the effect of the veto
once accomplished.
We can see this more distinctly by concentrating on the natural
limits to this concern. Clearly, if the police were allowed to move against
a speaker who had become too provocative, giving her hecklers a veto
over her message, that, in itself, need not result in the standardization of
her ideas, or ideas more broadly. Silencing a speaker is obviously not the
same as changing her mind, or anybody else’s. And besides, there are
other ways to spread a belief than by standing on soapboxes or marching
on the state capitol. But this means that the normative considerations
that Justice Douglas was gesturing at on behalf of the Terminiello Court
would seem not to take any particular interest in the heckled speaker and
her message at all. The wrong of the veto seems to turn instead on the
effects that the veto has for public expression itself, the sum total of ideas
expressed in the forum.
In Justice Douglas’s telling, the focus of the worry shifts subtly: away
from the effects on who is speaking and what is being said to the effects
on where it is being said. In this refocused view, the wrong of the heckler’s
veto is not that the government effectively sides against an unpopular
voice by helping its enemies to stifle it, which is a paradigmatic violation
of neutrality, a concern not clearly suggested in either Edwards or
Terminiello. The wrong is instead that, by siding with those who have
come not to speak but to disrupt the speech of others, the government
arrives only to end up shutting ideas out of the one place where they
should be able to flow most freely. In a quite real sense, the law joins the
115. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237.
116. Id. at 238.

HSIN-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2018]

5/26/18 12:47 PM

DEFENDING THE PUBLIC'S FORUM

1127

disrupters in shutting the forum down. And so, on this view, the wrong
of the veto in a case like Edwards—a large demonstration on a public
street, where as the numbers swell, the wrong against any one speaker
grows more diffuse¾has little directly to do with the government’s
privileging one voice over another. It instead has to do with the
government’s ceding a place traditionally open to all comers to only the
most dominant voices, its failure to defend the public’s forum.
B. CONTESTING PLACE AND THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER
The principle that Justice Douglas arguably enunciated in
Terminiello, and that Justice Stewart saw fit to repeat in Edwards, we
might call a principle of anti-standardization: that the government may
not join in standardizing expression within the forums it has opened to
the public.117 And what matters most about this principle is not what it
allows or forbids, but what it takes as its normative focus: the wrong
against the forum itself. This quite different sense of wrong not only
explains why the heckler’s veto, in these cases, seems such a non-starter,
but also what to do about it. A new principle, by giving us a new way of
modeling the concept, also offers a new solution to the problem of the
provocative speech. Before going to consider that solution, however, it
may help first to see what, more exactly, this talk of normative focus
comes to, and where the difference in focus comes from, and what both
can tell us about a case as seemingly unusual as Bible Believers.
Another way of indicating the particular focus I envision here is by
way of contrast, with a rival principle and differing focus. As Jed
Rubenfeld has argued, one might think that the principle lying behind
and informing our commitment to the freedom of speech is what he calls
the anti-orthodoxy principle,118 a principle stated famously by Justice
Robert Jackson:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.119

Now, as Rubenfeld understands it, the normative gist of this
principle¾that officials must not prescribe some opinion by proscribing
others¾reflects the intuition that people generally have the “right to
117. What counts as a forum open to the public may be thought of as the same forums deemed
‘public’ under the public forum doctrine. For a general discussion of the contestable nature and
boundaries of these distinctions, see Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The
History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
118. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 818 (2001).
119. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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their opinion,” so that any punishment for having or expressing those
opinions must be presumptively suspect.120 It could well be that this
intuition produces a principle too broad to explain the much narrower
reach of ordinary First Amendment doctrine, as Rubenfeld
acknowledges.121 Here the important thing is where that principle directs
Rubenfeld’s doctrinal attention, to the wrong inflicted on the individual
speaker and her opinions. The normative foundation of anti-orthodoxy,
the right to an opinion, thus gives rise to a certain doctrinal focus, the
wrong of curtailing the convictions of the individual conscience. And
applying the principle to the problem of the heckler’s veto, we naturally
find ourselves tracing the veto’s wrong to the effects it has on the
silenced: the violation of the individual’s right to express the deliverances
of her conscience, however provocatively unorthodox.
Contrast this picture with the one drawn by anti-standardization.
Under that principle, as explained in the last Part, the normative scrutiny
turns from the harm specifically done to individuals cut off by the
assisted hostility of a crowd, and looks instead to the place where those
disappointed speakers hoped to have their say¾the public streets,
sidewalks, and parks. Intuitively, then, we could say that the normative
gist of anti-standardization boils down to a right to the room to express
oneself, a right to expressive space, rather than the right to the opinion
expressed there. And that this concern should have assumed such
centrality in a civil-rights era case like Edwards should also come as no
surprise. The very point of the protests in those cases, after all, was not
just to make the protestors’ opinions known but to make themselves seen
in those places. As Timothy Zick has explained:
Racial segregation was an extensive and distinctly spatial regime that
expressly separated people by place¾separate restrooms, separate dining
facilities, segregated courthouses. To contest this racial-spatial
segregation, protestors sought access to legally and culturally forbidden
public and private places. Place was often used to reach and affect specific
audiences such as lawmakers, jailors, or judges. ‘Unauthorized’ spatial
presence was also used as a repertoire of contention owing to its symbolic
connection to messages of equality. In many instances, of course,
protestors hoped that by contesting places they would generate wider
public and media attention. In addition to images of police brutality in
public streets, spatial contests succeeded in riveting local and more general
audiences.122

In a string of cases after Edwards the Court gave constitutional
standing to this focus on contested place, holding that protests outside a
120. Rubenfeld, supra note 118, at 818.
121. Rubenfeld, supra note 118, at 818.
122. TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC
PLACES 106 (2009).
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courthouse123 and the Chicago mayor’s residence,124 and even inside a
public library,125 all received constitutional protection, and all apparently
for the same reason as in Edwards.
Of course even this concern, for the right to expressive space, has its
limits. And the Court appeared to indicate where some of those limits fell
in the one aberration from this otherwise unbroken line of victories for
the right to expressive space, in Adderley v. Florida.126 There the Court
upheld the convictions of several dozen Florida A&M students who had
marched to the local jail to protest, chiefly, the arrest the day before of
several other protesting students.127 Justice Black, writing now for the
majority, explained that a principal point of distinction between that case
and those other seemingly similar civil rights cases, like Edwards, came
down to a question of space. It came down, more precisely, to the way
that space had traditionally been used: the capitol grounds where the
protestors in Edwards marched were open to the public, he briskly
noted, while the driveway to the jail in Adderley was not.128 Adderley was
apparently as far a cry from Edwards as Edwards was from Feiner. And
the distance between them could be measured, somehow, by their
differing uses.
The Court itself never cashed out that ‘somehow,’ but one way we
might read the difference between these cases, taking a cue from Zick, is
as a matter of compatibility, between the nature of the protestors’
demonstration and the forum where they staged it.129 As Justice Black
implied in Adderley, protesting in “a driveway used only for jail
purposes”130 is simply incompatible with the sensitivities of a jailhouse,
where concerns not just for security but for privacy naturally run higher
than on a public driveway encircling a capitol or a courthouse. And so the
protestors’ takeover of the driveway there could not receive the same
constitutional blessing as, for example, the public library sit-in did in
Brown. Indeed, the plurality in Brown had made something like that
point. Brushing aside another sharp dissent by Justice Black, Justice
Fortas explained there that even though the protestors in that case had
somewhat regrettably chosen the library as their “stage for a
confrontation,” still, they had left its usual “quiet” and “beauty”
123. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
124. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
125. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
126. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
127. Id. at 39.
128. Id. at 40–41. In this case, as in many others on the heckler’s veto, the Court also put some
stock in the difference of definitional precision found in the common-law crime at issue in Edwards
and the trespass statute challenged in Adderley.
129. See ZICK, supra note 122, at 107.
130. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1996).
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undisturbed¾likely because nobody besides staff was there at the
time.131 Unlike the demonstration in Adderley, the silent occupation of a
few seats in a public library¾the expressive takeover of that space¾was
not hostile to its ordinary uses, the norms of the place. And that
distinction apparently made the constitutional difference.
Even though Adderley and Brown each involved a kind of expressive
takeover of public space, then, only in Adderley was that takeover hostile
to the norms of the forum itself, and so only there were the protestors’
convictions upheld. And that teaches a number of important lessons
about the way this forum-focused heckler’s veto works.
First, all of these civil rights era cases reveal that the heckler’s veto
can and sometimes does take on a different focus. That focus in those
cases draws from the point of the speech involved in them: the speakers
came not just to have their say but to contest the very place where they
proposed to have it¾the streets and sidewalks around a capitol or a
courthouse, or the seats of a public library. In each case the Court struck
down those speakers’ convictions for breaching the peace, as in Edwards,
despite apparently genuine fears that their presence threatened to stir
their onlookers to unrest, possibly violence. In all of these cases, that is,
the Court did as it always has since Feiner, and thwarted a heckler’s veto.
But the Court did that in Edwards, and in the toppling dominos of cases
afterward, because of what those convictions represented: an attack less
directly on the speakers in those cases than on the norms of the public
streets and sidewalks themselves, what Zick has called their democratic
functions.132 And so what made the heckler’s veto of these cases so clearly
out of the question had nothing directly to do with privileging one voice
over another, a violation of neutrality. The veto’s wrong instead turned
on what that accomplished attack meant for the forum: the empowering
of dominant groups to, in effect, rewrite the norms of the public’s forums
for their own purposes, making the forum in a very real sense theirs.
Anti-standardization, raised into a principle, merely makes this wrong
against the forum articulate.
On this reading, then, the civil-rights era cases beginning with
Edwards and leading to Gregory represent a different strain of heckler’s
veto case, what we might call the problem of the hostile takeover. In each
of those cases, the focus fell where the protestors themselves directed it:
to the space they had come to contest. The protestors had found, in their
temporary takeover of public places, a way to amplify their otherwise
publicly muted voices, and in all but one of those cases, their takeover
131. It appears that the only others in the library at the time were two of its librarians, a Mrs.
Reeves and Mrs. Perkins. See Brown, 383 U.S. at 140–41.
132. See ZICK, supra note 122, at 13–19.
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was fully compatible with the spaces they came to contest, the norms of
those places. In Adderley, however, the protestors had trespassed those
norms by trespassing onto the private driveway of a jailhouse, and for
that reason their expression no longer received constitutional protection.
Their takeover of that space was, to that extent, hostile. And for precisely
that reason we could also put the wrong of the heckler’s veto in Edwards,
Cox, and Gregory into the normatively laden terms of place. By letting a
crowd of onlookers, or just one librarian’s nerves, decide who can contest
a public space, the government joins in shutting that space down to the
public. In these cases the government wrongs us all by letting that attack
on one of our democratic forums go unanswered.
And Bible Believers arguably represents that wrong as well. As
Judge Rogers pointed out, the reason why pinning the label of heckler or
heckled was so hard there was precisely because the Bible Believers had
come to disrupt the festival¾their takeover was to that extent hostile to
our long democratic tradition of holding open the public sidewalks and
streets to all ideas and identities. The case was a far cry from Feiner, then,
precisely because it drew that much closer to Edwards, presenting not a
reasonably simple picture of a hostile audience attacking a speaker but
the much messier portrait of agitators staging a takeover of a forum
already occupied by others. Thus, the question that Judges Rogers and
Gibbons left unanswered in Bible Believers was what, doctrinally, should
be required of the police in cases of the latter type, where the threat of an
audience’s attack against a speaker recedes into the assertiveness of a
group intent on making the forum exclusively theirs.
C. THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER AND A NEW HECKLER’S VETO DOCTRINE
Even if we can clearly conceive of the heckler’s veto in these
forum-focused terms, the case law, as Judge Gibbons saw, offers rather
little guidance as to what ought to be done about it. What, doctrinally,
should the courts say about the heckler’s veto found in a case involving
the hostile takeover of a forum? And how would a focus on the forum help
resolve the problem that had so puzzled Kalven about these cases, that of
articulating a clear constitutional rule that can keep the peace while
encouraging expression in a contested space, besieged by speaker and
counter speakers? Perhaps the most obvious solution, fitting not only the
focus of this approach but also other constitutional principles, could
come by way of compromise: the police must preserve the openness of
the forum to as many speakers of as many viewpoints as possible. They
must defend the forum first.
What this doctrinal rule would require, more practically, is space:
specifically, enforced buffers between the clashing sides for as long as
they can be maintained. In keeping with the strictness of the scrutiny
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applied to restrictions in a public forum,133 the police must make every
effort not to silence anybody, which would help effect the very
standardization of views there that the forum-focused model centrally
rejects. Instead, their principal obligation would be to keep the warring
messengers separate within the forum, and shutting down only those
whose conduct turns from violently expressive to simple violence. Thus,
on this model, the Bible Believers could have had their say, but at a
reasonable distance from the festival they came to disrupt. As Judge
Rogers suggested, “[i]f bringing in a larger police force is not a then
available option in the reasoned view of the peace officer on the scene,
separating the parties” should and under this model would be considered
constitutionally sound.134
And this is true even if that enforced separation may have meant that
the Bible Believers would have had their voices somewhat drowned out,
their message diminished, by that distance. Nothing in the formulation
of anti-standardization suggests that speakers must have an equally
visible say, after all, only that they should have room enough to have
one.135 More, because the police could constitutionally move against any
one speaker only at the outbreak of considerable violence¾violence that
could no longer be reasonably suppressed by separation¾there would be
no question whether this restriction would face a separate challenge as a
violation of content or viewpoint neutrality. The question of what the
sides are saying need never and ought not come up. Instead, having
reframed the wrong of the heckler’s veto, the model focuses attention
directly on the effects on the forum, and only indirectly on the particular
listeners or speakers.
Aside from its consistency with the basic principle behind many of
the most important heckler’s veto cases,136 this forum-focused doctrine
133. Arguably, as a regulation only of the manner in the way the forum itself operates, this rule
would only need to satisfy a lesser form of scrutiny. Indeed, the consensus among lower courts is that
restrictions much more oppressive than what I contemplate here would qualify as time, place, and
manner regulations, needing only to meet intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of
Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that a “holding pen” established in advance of the 2004
Democratic National Convention was a neutral regulation needing only to have met intermediate
scrutiny). See generally Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV . 581 (2006)
(discussing critically the generally intermediate standard of review applied by lower courts to
free speech zone restrictions in public forums). For the sake of the analysis, however, I have assumed
it must meet strict scrutiny, which I believe it would, for the reasons outlined above.
134. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 277 (6th Cir. 2015) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
135. There are limits to the point, however, as zoning speech to the point of extinction¾by
excessively large obstructions between the sides, say, or by removing speakers too far from
others¾would make a mockery of the openness of the forum to all comers. For a discussion of these
considerations, see Zick, supra note 133.
136. Although under a forum-focused approach the principle of anti-standardization occupies a
central justificatory position, it does not occupy that position to the exclusion of other constitutional
principles. And so the doctrinal conclusion of that model¾the defend-the-forum rule¾need not be
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has several other key virtues. First, a defend-the-forum rule deliberately
mirrors the speaker-focused doctrine in its clarity and simplicity: it
provides relatively plain instructions to policing officials (create a buffer,
only move against speakers if violence gets out of hand and then only to
disperse all the crowds until order is restored), instructions already
followed by major police forces.137 Moreover, by dispensing with the need
to distinguish the sides, this model not only better respects the demand
of neutrality in cases of disruptive speech, it also eases administrability.
On this conception of the heckler’s veto, the police must do whatever they
can to keep the forum as open as possible to whomever is speaking, no
matter what they are saying. They must at least try, then, to make room
for everybody, regardless of who they are or what they might mean to
represent. Amid a disruption like the one witnessed in Bible Believers, a
rule of that simplicity is not only neater to apply, certainly more so than
one requiring an intractable sorting of speaker from counter-speaker, it
also leaves far less room for the play of bias in the policing. Not needing
to say who is who frees the police to do the job they know best¾keeping
the peace¾while efficiently caging their discretion within the literal
barriers they would instead be tasked with enforcing.
Finally, the forum-focused doctrine also gets right what the speakerfocused doctrine seemed to get badly wrong in Bible Believers. Unlike
that doctrine, the forum-focused model would not have called for an
essentially unlimited subsidy to protect disruptive speakers at the cost of
silencing an already little heard voice in American life. But this is also not
to say that the forum-focused approach would necessarily have counseled
a different result in Bible Believers. As the majority there pointed out, the
police did practically nothing to keep the forum open to both sides,138 not
even offering the Bible Believers the modest free speech zone they had
received the year before.139 But modeling the heckler’s veto this way does
mean that the Bible Believers, even had they prevailed, would also have
snatched a far more modest victory: a right to some room at the festival,
certainly, but not the right to tear a path of disruption through the next
year’s festival, police escort at their side. And that might just have been
taken to exclude other restrictions on the types of sanctions imposable on speakers in a public forum.
It is, for example, consistent with the rule suggested by the Court in Brown v. Louisiana, that a speaker
eliciting a hostile reaction cannot be charged for the resulting breach of the peace. Thus, if the police
found it necessary to escort the Bible Believers from the festival grounds to continue their protest just
outside it, they could still not be cited for the unrest provoked by their speech. Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131, 134 n.2 (1966).
137. See, e.g., D.C. M ETRO. POLICE DEP’T, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING FIRST
AMENDMENT ASSEMBLIES AND MASS DEMONSTRATIONS 15–23 (2016), https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/
SOP_16_01.pdf; see also Zick, supra note 133.
138. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 261.
139. Id. at 236.
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enough to convince the weary Dearborn public and the jittery festival
organizers to keep putting on their festival, knowing that they, too, had a
right to the public street, backed no less by the police baton.
IV. THE LAW OF THE PATCHWORK
Bible Believers was a case of many unfortunate ironies. Judge
Rogers and his fellow dissenters felt one especially acutely: the irony of
reading cases like Edwards and Cox and Brown to say that a group as
hateful as the Bible Believers had the right not just to wage their
disruptive campaign against a minority community’s festival, but to the
public’s subsidy to do so. And then there was the irony of the decision
itself: that the majority could call the case so easy when, to seven of the
fifteen judges, it was anything but. As the last two Parts have suggested,
these twinned ironies have their roots in a third: that the majority felt the
result not just on balance the right one, but indeed compelled by the
Court’s rejection of the heckler’s veto.140 The last Part has sought to
explain why, whatever the majority’s feeling, that compulsion had rather
little to do with either precedent or the open-ended concept of the
heckler’s veto.
But that does not quite put the majority’s position to rest. Merely
noticing that the majority appears to have slurred over the distinction
between the heckler’s veto concept and one conception of it obviously
does not argue that they erred in that conflation. But the first of these
ironies, summed up in Judge Rogers’ three anomalies, arguably does.
Since the court was at least notionally free to come out differently on
these facts, given that play in the conceptual joints, why in the face of
these anomalies would it not have done so? Irony can give us reason not
just to regret a result, but to reconsider it.
Clearly, however, the majority found that argument less than
convincing, and at least one member of the majority suggested why. As
Judge Boggs explained in a concurrence written directly in answer to
Judge Rogers, all of the talk of irony was simply beside the point, even
dangerous.141 “The beauty of our First Amendment is that it affords the
same protections to all speakers, regardless of the content of their
message.”142 This is true no matter whether one could fairly “characterize
[the Bible Believers] as disruptors,” or whether they came not to speak at
all, but just to get “violence . . . visited upon themselves.”143 Nor, to Judge

140. See id. at 248 (“Supreme Court precedent firmly establishes that the First Amendment does
not countenance a heckler’s veto.”).
141. See id. at 263–64 (Boggs, J., concurring).
142. See id. at 264.
143. Id. at 263.
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Boggs, was it remotely relevant that the Bible Believers might have to
come to disrupt what certainly looked like a “minority” community’s
fair¾a characterization that Judge Boggs was not even willing to concede
in the case¾or that one side was “punching up” and another “punching
down.”144 In short, Judge Boggs suggested that the court was bound to
apply the speaker-focused conception, for that conception sounds in
neutrality, and if any principle can lay claim to being the law of the First
Amendment, it surely would be that.145 “The law,” Judge Boggs
concluded, “simply requires the government to refrain from silencing
speakers.”146 And if that happens to upset the court’s sense of irony, then
so be it.147
This objection obviously runs much deeper than just a skirmishing
over practicalities. Indeed, it arguably draws much of its plausibility from
a considerably richer jurisprudential picture. On that picture, it makes
perfectly good sense to think of a principle like content neutrality as
something like a universal law of the First Amendment, subject to
exceptions only rarely, and then only for good reason.148 These
near-exceptionless principles govern the universe of legal creatures
much as physical laws that govern the literal universe in its galactic
expanses as well as its quantum interstices. And just as physicists aspire
to physical theories capable of unifying all the forces of the natural world
under a closed, deductive system, constitutional lawyers too are called on
to seek out and enact the ultimate theories¾or values¾that would unify
the organized forces of the state as well.149
This is obviously only a very brief sketch of a much richer view, but
it suffices to make clear that an objection like Judge Boggs’ is hardly
insubstantial. In this final Part, I outline an answer to that objection by
giving a few reasons why we can and should give up on the faith in the
picture informing it. That faith we might call a free speech
fundamentalism, and ultimately what makes that fundamentalism
untenable, this Part argues, is what it misses about the way our doctrine
works: that both theory and doctrine only come alive through the kinds
of models discussed in the preceding sections. Without those models, we
would have no way of applying those principles and allied theories. And
because we need those models to use our theories at all, we can also only
144. See id. at 264 (suggesting that it was “highly dubious” that the festival goers represented a
minority in the context).
145. See id. at 264.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See HORWITZ, supra note 97.
149. For a general overview of this position, see David S. Han, The Value of First Amendment
Theory, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 87 (2015). For an example of such a theory, see Alexander Tsesis, Free
Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015 (2015).
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ever be sure that our theories will apply when new cases look sufficiently
like the models we already have. To see the truth of these claims, or
perhaps just their sense, it will be easiest to begin with the way that this
lesson has come home to the philosophers of science who first pioneered
them in their study of the natural sciences¾beginning with, of all things,
a fable.
A. FREE SPEECH FABLES
Consider the story-in-miniature told by one of the great luminaries
of the German Enlightenment, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing:
A marten eats the grouse;
A fox throttles the marten; the tooth of the wolf, the fox.150

There is also a moral to this tiny tale, as Lessing tells it: “The weaker
are always the prey to the stronger.”151 Whether this questionable story
has any truth to it is beside the point here, which is instead structural:
what is the relation between the story and the lesson, the fable and its
moral? Analytically, on one side we have the vivid scenery of a picture,
the particulars depicted by the story: the concrete facts of martens
darting after plump grouses, of martens being hunted down by sleek
foxes, and of foxes being snatched up in the jaws of the wolf. On the other
side, by contrast, stands a line of stark abstractions¾the weaker, the
stronger, the relation of being-prey-to. So our question could be
reformulated to ask: how do the gripping facts of the fable relate to the
indifferent abstractions of its moral? How do the particulars connect to
the general?
For Lessing, the answer has two dimensions, one ontological and the
other epistemological: “The general exists only in the particular and can
only become graphic [anschauend] in the particular.”152 Only the first of
these, the ontological, matters for us here: the abstraction, Lessing says,
exists through the concrete story, and only there. But what does that
mean? Consider another example, offered by the philosopher Nancy
Cartwright:

150. In fact, the fable is borrowed from von Hagedorn. Nancy Cartwright & Robin Le Poidevin,
Fables and Models, 65 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 55, 59, 59 n.8 (1991). As will become clear,
in this discussion I am closely following Cartwright’s exposition of this point and her theory of
scientific models more generally.
151. Id. at 57.
152. Id. at 59.
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What did I do this morning? I worked. More specifically, I washed the
dishes, then I wrote a grant proposal, and just before lunch I negotiated
with the dean for a new position in our department. A well-known
philosophical joke makes clear what is at stake: ‘Yes, but when did you
work?’. It is true that I worked; but it is not true that I did four things in the
morning rather than three. ‘Working’ is a more abstract description of the
same activities I have already described when I say that I washed dishes,
wrote a proposal, and bargained with the dean.153

Working is not something that you do alongside the dishes or
preparing a grant proposal; it is a more general way of characterizing
those things that you did do, an abstract way of capturing of all those
concrete details that made up your morning.154 Nor is it the case that
what you did while working bears some kind of resemblance to
something called ‘work.’ As Lessing says of his fable, “[w]hat similarity
here does the grouse have with the weakest, the marten with the weak,
and so forth? Similarity! Does the fox merely resemble the strong and the
wolf the strongest or is the former the strong, the latter the strongest. He
is it.”155
Cartwright, again quoting Lessing, helpfully recasts the point:
The relationship between the moral and the fable is that of general to the
more specific, and it is ‘a kind of misusage of the words to say that the
special has a similarity with the general, the individual with its type, the
type with its kind.’ Each particular is a case of the general under which it
falls.156

Fables are not like their morals in some metaphysically mysterious
sense of likeness, nor are the morals concealed somehow within their
fables, as if the fable were just one of those optical illusions that we can
unlock by squinting hard enough at it, revealing its hidden picture.157
Instead, the fable fits out [einkleiden] the moral of the story, much as you
fit yourself out with a wardrobe for a new job.158 There is no property of
weakness disguised in the fluttering grouse or the flailing marten; nor is
‘strength’ somehow there alongside the slash of the fox’s paw, or the
chomp of the wolf’s bite. The abstractions of the moral¾the weakness
and strength, the preying upon¾just are there, concretely, in the

153. Id. at 60.
154. Note that the relation here is not the same as between genus and species. There is no
conjunction of genus and differentiae that would make what Cartwright did that morning, work, rather
than, say, the relief from it¾as washing dishes after negotiating with a difficult dean could well have
become. See id. at 61.
155. Id. at 59–60.
156. Id. at 60.
157. Id.
158. See id.
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characters of the fable, and those particulars are our way of
understanding those abstractions.159
Just the same is true, Cartwright claims, of the relationship between
abstract and concrete terms generally¾as in her special case of physical
theory. Fables, after all, show us how to “transform the abstract into the
concrete.”160 But that transformation does not imply identification. And
Cartwright is clear that in saying that generals exist through particulars,
she is not suggesting the reduction of one to the other. Saying that you
were working this morning when washing the dishes adds something that
simply saying you were washing the dishes otherwise lacks. That is
because ‘work’ brings with it its own living tissue of abstract
relations¾invoking with it concepts like ‘value’ and ‘leisure’ and even
‘dignity’161¾that hardly follow from the mere dunking of plates into
sudsy water. We can understand the fable before mentioning its moral,
just as we can learn what it means to rinse the glasses before we
understand that doing so is often a tiresome chore, a sort of work. And
yet, as shown in the example of the fable, the abstract moral exists for us
only through the concreteness of the story, by coming to be fitted out by
the particulars of the fables we tell.
What is true of our fables, Cartwright claims, is also true of our
science¾and, I want to add, of our law as well.162 Indeed, we can regard
constitutional law as a collection of many fables¾a collection of models
that we use to fit out the simple and absolute words of our Constitution.
To see the truth of this claim we need look no farther than the now
standard model of the heckler’s veto and where it got its start: in the story
that began this Article, of Feiner’s confrontation with the Syracuse mob.
That story just is our way of fitting out the principle that courts have ever
since taken it to stand for¾its moral of neutrality. And in case after case
since, from Edwards down to Bible Believers, we can see the courts
dutifully fitting out the scenes depicted in the pleadings before them with
the same roles of the same drama that unfolded on the streets of Syracuse
half a century ago¾of the law arriving on the scene only to end up
silencing the unpopular, the fabled strong conquering the weak.
The way this works in detail¾the way we cash out what might feel
more like a metaphor than an analysis¾also closely resembles the way
159. For an account of how this insight¾the epistemological side of Lessing’s point¾figures in
scientific thinking, see RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS 84–118 (1999).
160. Cartwright & Le Poidevin, supra note 150, at 57.
161. This is of course why we can say that much of what women traditionally did at home was just
an uncompensated, and unacknowledged, sort of work¾a thought that would not occur to somebody
who did not regard washing dishes as working.
162. See Cartwright & Le Poidevin, supra note 150, at 62–68; see also Nancy Cartwright, Models:
Parables v Fables, in BEYOND MIMESIS AND CONVENTION: REPRESENTATION IN ART AND SCIENCE
19 (Roman Frigg & Matthew C. Hunter eds., 2010).
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Cartwright sees physical laws coming to be fitted out with models. As
Cartwright explains, in the context of Newton’s second law of motion:
Once we know how to pick the characters, we can construct a fable to ‘fit
out’ Newton’s [second] law by leaving them alone to play out the behavior
dictated by their characters: that is what I called . . . a model for a law of
physics. For Lessing’s moral, he picked the grouse and the marten. Now we
can look to see if the grouse is prey to the marten. Similarly, we have the
small mass m located a distance r from the larger mass M. Now we can look
to see if the small mass moves with an acceleration GM/r2 (since
GM/r2=F/m). If it does, we have a model for Newton’s law.163

Many of the same features can be found in our First Amendment
doctrine.164 On the one hand, we have a principle like that of neutrality,
structurally not unlike the physical principle articulated by the universal
law of gravitation (F=mGM/r2), telling us both what characters and
relations to look for¾a speaker riling up a crowd with her words, police
stepping in to silence her¾and what normatively to think of those
relations.165 The fable, on the other hand, makes those characters and
relations concrete; the story brings the abstract moral or principle to life,
in a visible clash of voices in which the government is seen to be picking
sides. Thus, the story of Feiner on his soapbox fits out the principle of
neutrality¾building what I have called a model of that principle¾much
as a two-body system fits out or models the physical interactions revealed
by Newton’s universal law of gravitation. The laws of physics come to life
in the particulars of these models,166 just as our First Amendment
principles gather concreteness in the telling of stories like Feiner’s. Those
stories transform the generality of a principle like neutrality into the
memorable particulars of a plot.
These fables have more than just an illustrative or pedagogic point,
however. They are also our way of applying and extending the morals we
tell with them; our tools for devising rules out of the principles we take
our doctrine to stand for and for reapplying those principles to future
cases.167 In the case of physical theory, once we have gotten the hang of
163. Cartwright & Le Poidevin, supra note 150, at 63.
164. I am hardly the first to claim that something like what I am calling fables or models are central
to our understanding of constitutional text, though the lessons I seek to draw from this observation
differ somewhat. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119,
1170 (1995) (describing the so-called “[p]aradigm cases” that “form the spine of interpretation on the
model of writing”).
165. On this latter point the doctrinal and the physical models diverge: a physical model tells us
what is true in the model, while the doctrinal tells what ought to be true.
166. Cartwright, supra note 150, at 62–63.
167. The account I give here is only of principled constitutional decisionmaking, where, as Robert
Post has put it, the decisionmakers strive to implement constitutional objectives. I do not mean to
suggest that all constitutional decisions need be or are this principled. See Robert Post, Reconciling
Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2361–63 (2000);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law, 74 SOC. RES. 1,
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how to fit out a law we can begin to draw up hypotheses about how that
still-idealized system will work in detail.168 It is only a short step from
seeing that a moon swirling around a planet fits out the law of gravitation
to making specific claims about the interactions and properties of those
bodies, like the magnitude of the moon’s accelerative force.
Constitutional doctrine, once again, works much the same way. As
already seen in the case of the heckler’s veto, once we have in hand a
principle like neutrality or anti-standardization we also come by an
indication of what doctrinal rule would make sense. The relation here is
not quite like that in the physical model. In general there is no deducing
a doctrinal rule from a legal principle in the way that hypotheses can, at
least sometimes, be deduced from mathematized models.169 But that is
not to say that doctrinal principles impose no limits: neutrality would not
tolerate a rule saying heckled protestors sympathetic to the current
administration should be defended and others not, just as
anti-standardization would not brook the closing of the public streets to
all but those boosting the police. Doctrinal rules may not emerge through
modus ponens, but they often do arise from some argument.170
And these models, our fables, do more than just fit out doctrinal
rules. They also guide our application of those rules to new cases. Once
we have learned to focus our attention on the right relations and
characters indicated by a moral, there is no principled limit to the uses
we can make of that moral or of a well-fitted fable. A story of wolves and
martens can become one about big-box stores luring customers from the
mom-and-pop shops, just as Feiner’s story can speak to the case of the
unpopular politician shouted down from her podium in a public square.
We thus fit and refit our free speech fables from case to case, from one
fact pattern to the next. And so the courts have applied the standard
model of the heckler’s veto to cases that look much like Feiner’s and even
to cases that do not, as in Bible Believers.
B. AGAINST FUNDAMENTALISM
Obviously this is only a glimpse of a much larger view, and much
more would need to be said to complete it convincingly. But if the relation
3 (2007) (describing instances of “full particularity” where “people agree on a result without agreeing
on any kind of supporting rationale”).
168. See Ronald N. Giere, How Models Are Used to Represent Reality, 71 PHIL. SCI. 742, 744
(2004).
169. See NANCY CARTWRIGHT, THE DAPPLED WORLD: A STUDY OF THE BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE 3–4
(1999). This is not to say that deduction figures all that commonly even in the treatment of real physical
systems. See id. at 9–10.
170. There are also discernible strengths and weaknesses of such arguments, even if not strictly
logical in nature. See Scott Brewer, Relevancy, in EVIDENCE 1, 44–49 (10th ed. 2017) (on file with the
Author).
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between the doctrinal principle and cases can be pictured this way¾if
applying a constitutional concept requires, like a physical concept, that it
first be fitted out with a model¾then we will also see why the
fundamentalist picture seems to get things upside down. And that is
because, if models matter in the way just described, there is simply no
reason to believe that the fables we tell for the First Amendment will
apply universally.
To see why this is so, we need only look at the way models work: that
they, like fables, can fail to fit. The point is hardly unique to the
theoretical concepts found in physics or, for that matter, constitutional
doctrine. As Cartwright points out, even a concept like ‘work’ can hardly
be said to apply with total generality. Is it really fair to say, as a pre-school
teacher once did to her, that a child’s work is play? The point becomes all
the more obvious when we try to apply the implications of a fable’s moral
to an ill-fitted case: if a child’s play really is her work, what would she do
with her time off? And that was the lesson Judge Rogers effectively drew
in Bible Believers. The majority’s struggling to press the facts of that case
into the speaker-focused model produced exactly those anomalies that
made the result there so “unfortunately ironic,” and the use of that
doctrine so “formalistic.” Those anomalies, to put the point in these
terms, were the result of trying to make the moral of neutrality and the
fable we tell about it¾Feiner’s fable¾fit facts that just would not bear
out that moral.
Already, this puts considerable strain on fundamentalism. If the
only way to apply a theory is by fitting it out with a model, and if models
at least occasionally do not fit, then there will be cases where the theory
simply will not apply. But Cartwright goes on to make a still stronger
claim: though a moral will be true of its fable, just as law is true of its
model, there is no guarantee, and little reason to believe empirically, that
the moral (or law) will be true of much beyond it.171 It is not that legal
principles, like morals, fall just short of full universality. Much worse, we
can be sure that they make sense only in the circumstances depicted in
their models, or in circumstances exceedingly like them. And that is
because these models, like the fables we tell, are themselves creatures of
abstraction and idealization. We simplify¾or idealize¾real situations by
assuming away in our thought-experiments, or carefully eliminating in
the laboratory, conditions that interfere with the system we are trying to
model: as, in the case of the pendulum, when we set the frictional or other
forces acting on the ball and string to zero. Similarly, we abstract from
those real systems by subtracting features of the real-life situation
irrelevant to the properties under study: thus we consider the abstracted
171. Cartwright & Le Poidevin, supra note 150, at 67–68.
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property of the swinging ball’s mass, ignoring its material properties.172
The result is a working model of a highly idealized system, of which we
can say with mathematical precision what will happen when, in that
example, the ball is released at a certain angle from vertical.
But the price of fruitful simplification is a narrowing of fit. By the
time we are done with all our idealizing and abstracting, few, if any, real
systems will resemble the resulting model. Trimming and fine-tuning the
situation just so means that only systems closely approximating that
trimmed and tuned picture will work just that way. And hence
Cartwright, along with other post-positivist philosophers of science like
Ronald Giere, have drawn the perhaps startling conclusion that scientific
laws¾themselves a kind of moral on this account, outfitted with their
own fables¾are never strictly true of situations beyond their interpretive
models. We instead have to be quite fortunate, or quite careful, to see a
law come to life.173
This is equally true of the First Amendment. As others have pointed
out, no First Amendment principle extends to all cases and contexts.174
At some point the doctrinal principle will inevitably begin to mislead,175
just as outside of the careful experimental calibrations the laws of physics
will begin to lie.176 And that is also why an otherwise serviceable
conception will sometimes lead to intolerable anomalies, as the speakerfocused model did in Bible Believers. Precisely because we need these
models to apply concepts like the heckler’s veto, we can only ever be sure
of how those concepts will apply when new cases look sufficiently like the
models we already have. And in those not atypical cases where our
existing models do not quite seem to fit, their principles will fit our
judgment of the cases quite poorly, if at all.177
The reason for that misfit, moreover, is the same in law as it is in the
natural sciences. For like any other science, law also lives in a world
172. I am simplifying here to some degree, but these simplifications do not alter the point made
above. See Nancy Cartwright, Reply to Eells, Humphrey, and Morrison, 55 PHIL. PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH 177, 177-78 (1995) (discussing her view of idealization and abstraction).
173. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 169, at 4.
174. Post, supra note 167, at 2373–74.
175. HORWITZ, supra note 97, at 42–67.
176. See generally NANCY CARTWRIGHT, HOW THE LAWS OF PHYSICS LIE (1983) (discussing the limits
of physical laws); see also GIERE, supra note 159, at 84–96.
177. Here I am appealing to two distinct notions of ‘fit.’ One is descriptive, and has natural
affinities with the notion of fit that we use when we say that the plastic and metal models found in
biology classrooms “fit” the double-helical chemical structure we have come to know as DNA. But there
is another notion of ‘fit’ having a normative dimension, ‘fit’ as intuitive ‘rightness.’ Although I cannot
defend the point here, it seems to me clear that both have bases in our basic cognitive psychological
makeup. For a recent and illuminating discussion of this point, see HUGO MERCIER & DAN SPERBER,
THE ENIGMA OF REASON 299–315 (2017) (describing the role of ‘intuitive inference’ in moral and
political reasoning); see also GIERE, supra note 159.
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peopled by idealizations and ruled by abstractions. One need only flip
through the pages of law reviews and case reporters to see the truth of
that, with our highly stylized talk of speakers and forums. Among the
casualties of this idealizing is a sense of relevance, of what goes missing
from our models. Just consider the strangely detached ways we discuss
the heckler’s veto: the party heckled in a case like Feiner is not just any
speaker, but a person giving voice to a real, unique, often idiosyncratic
take on things.178 The original puzzle of provocative speech, lest we
forget, first appeared in a book about The Negro and the First
Amendment179¾a fact that could hardly be read off the sanitized
abstractions articulating Justice Black’s model of the problem.
Idealization and abstraction are as much a fact of life in the law as
in the laboratory.180 And so to have a working constitutional concept, one
capable of deciding anything doctrinally, one must first find for it a
suitable working model. Models matter immensely, then, in our
constitutional law. For, as already seen, models directly mediate between
otherwise quite open-ended concepts like the heckler’s veto and far more
practical doctrinal rules.181 They are therefore central to making a rule of
law out of the quite capacious abstractions of our Constitution.182 They
structure and consolidate our expectations, by assigning definite
doctrinal limits in particular institutional and other contexts. They also
draw those limits in light of our sense of what makes for a democratic
wrong, expressing what John Dewey once called the “basic loyalties” that
define our democratic values¾our ideals.183 Ultimately, however, they
178. Paul Horwitz has nicely captured this point in what he calls the lure of acontextuality. See
HORWITZ, supra note 97, at 5–7.
179. KALVEN, JR., supra note 9, at 140.
180. For some, like the philosopher Charles W. Mills, this may be a fact more for regret than
celebration, for, as Mills fairly points out, careless idealization can all too easily build profound
injustices into our moral or legal doctrines. See Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology,
20 HYPATIA 165 (2005). I am inclined to say, however, that the answer to Mills’ worries about
impoverished idealization and bad abstractions are richer idealizations and better abstractions. For
an answer to Mills’s concerns along these lines, see Leif Hancox-Li, Idealization and Abstraction in
Models of Injustice, 32 HYPATIA 329–332 (2017).
181. There is thus a clear symmetry here with Margaret Morrison and Mary S. Morgan’s
characterization of scientific models as instrumental mediators between scientific theory and data. See
generally Margaret Morrison & Mary S. Morgan, Models as Mediating Instruments, in MODELS AS
MEDIATORS: PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 2 (Mary S. Morgan & Margaret Morrison
eds., 1999).
182. In this way, models occupy, and vindicate, a middle ground between what Farber and Frickey
have called fundamentalism and the sort of “pure eclecticism” suggested some while ago by Steven
Shiffrin. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1627–28 (1987) (discussing both views).
183. John Dewey, The Basic Values and Loyalties of Democracy, in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER
WORKS: 1939–1941 275 (2008). In this sense the approach I advocate in this Article is also resolutely
Realist¾or, as Dewey would have said, experimentalist. See Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories,
Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1907 (2015) (noting the Realist belief

HSIN-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1144

5/26/18 12:47 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:1099

can do both only in a piecemeal way, context by context. A patchwork
First Amendment will be as much as we can ever hope for, then, on this
picture. But with all the sense it can make of the diverse ways we live out
our lives, that is already quite a lot.
C. TOWARD A DAPPLED HECKLER’S VETO DOCTRINE
A reader of fundamentalist persuasion, skimming the last two
sections, would no doubt shake her head in disbelief. Surely, we should
not let the law to become this unruly even if it were notionally possible,
the disbelief might go, for surely we want the sort of predictability and
stability that comes standard with a world governed according to
fundamentalist belief. And Bible Believers might make a case in point:
why would we not want a world in which we could confidently say, with
Judge Boggs, that, “The law simply requires the government to refrain
from silencing speakers”?184
The answer to that also finds a case in point in Bible Believers: as
Judge Rogers and the dissenters showed, irony can and sometimes
should matter. What sense would it make, after all, to cling to the
speaker-focused conception of the heckler’s veto in the face of the
increasingly common cases where heckling bleeds into and blurs with
counter-speech, and where the supposed “speaker” has come not
primarily to express herself but to take over the forum by enlisting the
police to shut it down? In these cases, only a formalistic inertia could
support a rule requiring the police to join in the hostile takeover of the
public’s forum by becoming a phalanx to the hostage takers. In these
cases, where the forum itself has come under attack, it seems simply to
make better sense to say that the police should defend it first.
But it also seems to make sense only of those cases. Justice Black
sensed fairly enough that the police had wronged Feiner as speaker by
pulling him down from his box¾that the police had arrived to take over
by literally taking him. The wrong of what the police did there, in other
words, fell just where the speaker-focused model would place it: what
that silencing meant for Feiner as speaker, and thus for his message. In
these cases, where drawing the line between heckled and heckler is as
easy as drawing a cordon around the soapbox orator, we naturally feel
that wrong runs directly to her, as speaker. And we therefore feel it only
right that our doctrine should defend her first. This Article has suggested
that what makes those feelings legitimate¾what makes good
that the core functions of law are consolidating expectations and expressing our ideals); John Dewey,
Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 27 (1924–1925) (pitching his theory of law and legal
reasoning as experimentalist).
184. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 264 (6th Cir. 2015) (Boggs, J., concurring).
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constitutional sense¾has much more to do with the practicalities of
context than with something as abstract, and as practically inert, as a
concept like the heckler’s veto. And as that context drifts, so too will our
sense of what is constitutionally legitimate.
The Bible Believers majority was therefore not altogether wrong in
seeing the heckler’s veto as they did. Their mistake lay instead in failing
to see that the veto could also be something more. And so the subsidy for
provocative speech rightly flowed in that case, but along the wrong
normative currents. This Article has argued that the time has come for a
redirection in the law of provocative speech. But this need not mean, nor
ought it to mean, that we should replace the familiar speaker-focused
model. We should instead displace it from the center of our doctrinal
attention, by giving more exacting consideration to the many cases where
other models, differently focused, would better fits the facts. To do that,
however, we will first have to convince ourselves that our doctrine will
need to be far more dappled than it already is.
CONCLUSION
Our constitutional law will always be deeply dappled,185 more a
messy patchwork of models than the simpler world of broad and largely
exceptionless theories. And so it will also be a law in which irony has its
place, as it should have had in Bible Believers. As this Article has argued,
taking seriously the ironies of that case would have yielded a law of the
heckler’s veto in some ways messier than the law we have now, gripped
as it still is by a fable like Feiner’s, of hostile audiences and soapbox
orators. But introducing that little bit of messiness, through renewed
focus on the public’s forums, would also have its compensations. Not
least among them would be a little more room for voices still too rarely
heard today amid the sometimes discomforting din of democratic life.

185. I owe this term as well to Cartwright, who borrowed it from Gerard Manley Hopkins’s paean
to “Pied Beauty.” See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 169, at 19.
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